I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases

[olcott]

*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*

knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

No, you just became a good example of the sort of thing that becomes the
loophole.

You clearly don't understand the problem, because you don't understand
that the observer doesn't know enough to determine if the reasoning is
sufficient.

Sorry, you are just too stupid to understand your stupidity,

[olcott]

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.

My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.

With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

But how does he get that?

Your definition is just more your your illogical assumptiom of the
conclusion.

Thus, it doesn't actually handle the problem, but just shows that you
dont actually understand the issue.

This is a fundamental problem with ANY logic based on observation. How
do we know that an observation of the universe is actually "correct" and
does not contain an error.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

When the truth of a belief is a necessary consequence of its
justification then this justification is necessarily sufficient.

"This article talks about planets in our solar system"
https://www.space.com/16080-solar-system-planets.html
Is verified by the article talking about planets in our solar system.

Believing the the boiling point of water is about 212 degrees F
on the basis of looking it up in a textbook also seems to be
a sufficient reason.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

How does that handle the case where described where the error is in the
interpreation of the observatin.

Post by olcott
When the truth of a belief is a necessary consequence of its
justification then this justification is necessarily sufficient.

But what it the justification was wrong?

Post by olcott
"This article talks about planets in our solar system"
https://www.space.com/16080-solar-system-planets.html
Is verified by the article talking about planets in our solar system.

But, how do you know that it is a CORRECT description of the planets, or
uses the correct definition of planets?

Post by olcott
Believing the the boiling point of water is about 212 degrees F
on the basis of looking it up in a textbook also seems to be
a sufficient reason.

Then you better live near sea level, or you will be wrong, it appear
that the boiling point of water in Denver is about 202 F (95C).

Also, textbooks can be wrong.

After all, Textbooks say that the Halting Problem is unsolvable, so
either you admit that you have wasted decades going after something that
you are now trying to say must had sufficient justification, or you
admit that your current idea is just wrong.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

[Mikko]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth
preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.

{Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions. The way you keep falling back to it shows that your
understanding of Logic is very limited.

Post by olcott
That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth
preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.

Right, but the connection might be infinite in length.

Post by olcott
{Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.

Which you can't seem to explain how it differs from the classical
semantic truth created by the (possibly infinite) chain of logical steps
from the fundamental truth-makers of the system.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

[Richard Damon]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Yes, it seems his understanding of logic is so limited, that the
problems he is tryihg to solve just don't exist in that system, but
doens't understand that is the fact.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
by applying Rules to Facts in L.

Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
    by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't actually
know what you are talking about.

My guess is that about half the words you use have been done with a
"private" meaning somewhat different from the conventional meaning
because you don't understand how those terms are actually used in the
system.

[olcott]

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't actually
know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

[Python]

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog

You can stipulate fallacies, it doesn't turn them into truth.

Post by olcott
freaking nitwit.

Nice signature Peter!

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Sorry, you just admitted that you are just a liar, because you think
words are ultimately flexable in meaning.

[Mikko]

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog
implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.

They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.

They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.

You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its
justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog
implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.

They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.

The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

Just the architecture of Prolog Facts and Rules such that
(a) Facts are expressions stipulated to be true.
(b) Rules are truth preserving operations.
(c) Expression x is only true in L when x is derived
     by applying Rules to Facts in L.
Underlying this is a knowledge ontology inheritance
hierarchy that is similar to a type hierarchy of an
simultaneously arbitrary number of orders of logic
in the same formal system.

Just shows you are flapping your mouth with gibberish and don't
actually know what you are talking about.

I am stipulating how those terms work in my
adaptation of Prolog you freaking nitwit.

Then you aren't talking "Prolog", which is a fairly defined language.

Is and is not. There is the standard Prolog but the name Prolog was already
in use before the first standard. There are many different variants that
are not standard conforming but are calloe "Prolog" anyway.

They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true"
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.

I have defined this at least 100 times.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

The last line that returns false rejects LP.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.

I have defined this at least 100 times.

As you didn't point to even one such definitions I think you have not.

Post by olcott
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.

No, it does not reject, it just answers the question on the second last line.
Another answer about LP is on the third last line and there is no rejection
there.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.

Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.

Prolog is like a 100% empty mind until we tell it
some facts it literally knows nothing.

When we tell it "cats are animals" is a fact it knows
literally nothing else.

The entire verbal model of the actual world is built
this same way.

"The Earth is spherical" makes exactly as much sense
as "dgfjlok ergkoi rti932rm 45 njedfww" until specified
otherwise.

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.

I have defined this at least 100 times.

As you didn't point to even one such definitions I think you have not.

Post by olcott
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.

No, it does not reject, it just answers the question on the second last line.
Another answer about LP is on the third last line and there is no rejection
there.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.

Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.

Nope, because you don't understand how linguistics were developed.

Sorry, you are just proving your stupidity.

The words had there meaning long before "logic" was invented.

Post by olcott
Prolog is like a 100% empty mind until we tell it
some facts it literally knows nothing.
When we tell it "cats are animals" is a fact it knows
literally nothing else.
The entire verbal model of the actual world is built
this same way.
"The Earth is spherical" makes exactly as much sense
as "dgfjlok ergkoi rti932rm 45 njedfww" until specified
otherwise.

Right, but is a LIE, as the Earth isn't "Sphreical", only "Spheroid" or
to be more correct an Oblate Spheroid.

Of course, you don't understand that distinction, because you don't
understand that when talking about the physical universe, "Truth" in the
logical sense doesn't actually fully apply, but only approximation models.

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
x = "this sentence is not true
if ~True(L,x) & ~True(L,~x) "x is rejected as invalid input"

What connection that has to Prolog?

Anyway, you still have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how
that relates to the behaviour of Prolog programs, and you have not
answered the last question.

I have defined this at least 100 times.

As you didn't point to even one such definitions I think you have not.

Post by olcott
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The last line that returns false rejects LP.

No, it does not reject, it just answers the question on the second last line.
Another answer about LP is on the third last line and there is no rejection
there.

[Mikko]

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.

Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.

Nope, because you don't understand how linguistics were developed.
Sorry, you are just proving your stupidity.
The words had there meaning long before "logic" was invented.

Logic was invented before "cat" and "animal" had meaning in the
same language.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott
They all have negation as failure, the key element
required to reject self-contradictory expressions.

The not operator of Prolog is not a part of Horn clause system. It is
not the same as the not operator of ordinary logic. Therefore one nust
be careful with its use and interpretation.
You have not defined what you mean with "reject" and how that relates
to the behaviour of Prolog programs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negation_as_failure
The failure to prove X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue yet not necessarily false.
The failure to prove X or ~X from Facts and Rules
means that X is untrue and unfalse, thus not a
truth bearer.

X may represent a real world claim that is either true or false but
cannot be determined either way with Prolog rules.

When a Prolog Fact is specified that cats are animals
then we can know by Prolog Facts that cats are animals.

We know that even if no Prolog fact about that is specified.

Not one single being in the universe understood
that "cats are animals" was anything but pure gibberish
until this was specified.

That was well understood long before there was any Prolog.
Even before "cat" and "animal" were words in the same language
similar relations were understood but expressed with other
words.

Post by olcott
Prolog is like a 100% empty mind until we tell it
some facts it literally knows nothing.
When we tell it "cats are animals" is a fact it knows
literally nothing else.
The entire verbal model of the actual world is built
this same way.

It is not a model of the actual world unless the words are related
to the actual world.

Post by olcott
"The Earth is spherical" makes exactly as much sense
as "dgfjlok ergkoi rti932rm 45 njedfww" until specified
otherwise.

The meanings of the words "Earth" and "spherical" come from tradition,
not from specifications. Specifications may override the meanings
for some purposes (in which case "The Earth is spherical" can be false
as the Earth is not exactly spherical).

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

From the mistake of undecidability incompleteness is
mistaken to occur.

This happens because even most modern philosophers are
too stupid to understand that self-contradictory expressions
such as the Liar Paradox are not truth-bearers thus must
be rejected as invalid input.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

But the statement that Godel proved to be true but not provable in PA
wasn't self-contradictory.

You are just proving your own stupidity.

Post by olcott
From the mistake of undecidability incompleteness is
mistaken to occur.
This happens because even most modern philosophers are
too stupid to understand that self-contradictory expressions
such as the Liar Paradox are not truth-bearers thus must
be rejected as invalid input.

No, you are just to stupid to understand that you don't know what you
are talking about, and just proving that you are nothing but a pathetic
ignorant pathological lying idiot that can't understand that he doesn't
kow what he is talking about because he brainwashed himself with his lies.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.

The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.

Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Post by Mikko
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.
The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.

Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

"this sentence is not true" is not a truth bearer
that must be rejected as invalid input and not the
basis for the undecidability theorem.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Except that the statement that Godel used isn't such a thing, just
beyond your understanding, so you think it is just a "piece of shit"
when that is actually better a description of your ideas.

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.
The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.

Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
   It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
   in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
   x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
   with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
   https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

Right, "It would then be possible ...", thus the following isn't "an
assumption" but an action that has been proven to be constructioable as
a valid statement in the language, thus something the Truth Predicate
must answer about to be a Predicate.

You are just proving you are nothing but a stupid liar, that is so
stupid, he can't see that he doesn't know what he is talkinga bout.

Post by olcott
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
"this sentence is not true" is not a truth bearer
that must be rejected as invalid input and not the
basis for the undecidability theorem.

In other words, all logic system of the ability described by Tarski MUST
be inconsistent.

Since he PROVED that the statement *WAS* a vaild input for the Truth
Predicate.

Something that seems to be beyond your ability to understand because of
your stupidity.

[olcott]

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Except that the statement that Godel

I never mentioned Godel stupid.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog
implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Except that the statement that Godel

I never mentioned Godel stupid.

But you mentioned "Incompleteness", and he is the one that proved it,
and NOT with a Self-Contradictory statement.

So, are you admitting that Godel didn't use a "Self-contradictory"
statement, and thus you are wrong, or are you admitting that you are
just wrong for saying you weren't talking about Godel?

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.

Invalid expression is a non-expression (i.e., a string that does
not satisfy the syntax rules of an expression) used as if it were
an expression.

Post by olcott
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
An incosistent theory cannot be incomplete, at least if any ordinary
logic is used. If you want to use a paraconsistent logic then you
must be very careful with terms of ordinary logic.
The basic theory behind Prolog is Horn Clauses, where incompleteness
cannot be differentiated from consistency. Standard Prolog has features
that break the logic if used but the terms "incompleteness" and
"consistency" are only defined for logic, not programming.

Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
"this sentence is not true" is not a truth bearer
that must be rejected as invalid input and not the
basis for the undecidability theorem.

The string "this sentence is not true" is not a valid arithmetic sentence
and therefore not relevant to definability of arithmetic truth. Arithmetic
truth is about sentences like

∀x ∃a ∃b ∃c (x < a ∧ x < b ∧ x < c ∧ a*a*a + b*b*b = c*c*c).

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA
truth preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.

Invalid expression is a non-expression (i.e., a string that does
not satisfy the syntax rules of an expression) used as if it were
an expression.

Post by olcott
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
instead of invalid input.

Of course incompleteness can be differentiated from incosistency.

Self-contradictory expressions are incorrect deemed to be
undecidable expressions instead of invalid expressions.

Invalid expression is a non-expression (i.e., a string that does
not satisfy the syntax rules of an expression) used as if it were
an expression.

Post by olcott
Is this "actual piece of shit" "a rainbow" or "a car engine"?
I can't decide, therefore the formal system is incomplete.
(The correct answer is neither, yet the correct answer is not allowed).

Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

[Richard Damon]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.

Since English isn't a formal language, that isn't very good.

You are just proving that you don't really understand what you are
talking about.

[Mikko]

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.

That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish. One can say that the procedure division of a COBOL program is
fromalized Ensglish but its expressive power is very limited.

[olcott]

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.

That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish.

WHY THE HELL WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT I DON'T MEAN ALL OF IT?

Post by Mikko
One can say that the procedure division of a COBOL program is
fromalized Ensglish but its expressive power is very limited.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.

That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish.

WHY THE HELL WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT I DON'T MEAN ALL OF IT?

Obviously, you don't understand the question, because you don't
understand the problem.

There isn't an "All" that can apply.

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
One can say that the procedure division of a COBOL program is
fromalized Ensglish but its expressive power is very limited.

[Mikko]

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko
Who allows the question but not the correct answer? You?

The expressivity of language allows this.

Depends on the language. The formal language of the first order Peano
arithmetic does not allow questions.

I am always assuming a language that is at least
as expressive as formalized English.

That does not mean anything without specification of which formalization
of Enslish.

WHY THE HELL WOULD YOU ASSUME THAT I DON'T MEAN ALL OF IT?

It does not matter what you mean as long as you don't tell anybody else.

[olcott]

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions. The way you keep falling back to it shows that your
understanding of Logic is very limited.

The architecture Prolog implementations can be extended to
an arbitrary number of simultaneous orders of logic, like
type theory or a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.

The only thing that were are taking from Prolog is the notion of
Facts and Rules and true means expression X is only true on L when
X is derived from Facts in L by applying Rules.

Facts apply to formal language and natural language and are
stipulated to be true. Here is what Haskell Curry calls them:
"an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true."
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

Rules apply to natural language and are a sequence of truth
preserving operations.

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott
That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth
preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.

Right, but the connection might be infinite in length.

That would not be true in L.

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // indicates infinite evaluation sequence

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott
{Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.

Which you can't seem to explain how it differs from the classical
semantic truth created by the (possibly infinite) chain of logical steps
from the fundamental truth-makers of the system.

The key difference is that all expressions that were
previously undecidable become rejected as not truth-bearers
in L. The key benefit of this is that Tarski Undefinability
is refuted enabling LLM systems to be able to detect their
own falsehoods thus getting rid of AI hallucination.

We certainly can never have reliable artificial general
intelligence (AGI) when an AI system has no way to tell a
lie from the truth.

[Richard Damon]

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by Mikko

Post by olcott

Post by olcott
*I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
justification is sufficient reason to accept the
truth of the belief.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
the observer does not know enough to know its true
yet it remains stipulated to be true.
My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
the truth of the belief.

What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
belief involves other belifs that could be false.

For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.

If the belief is about something real then its justification
involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.

I don't think that is correct.
My left hand exists right now even if it is
a mere figment of my own imagination and five
minutes ago never existed.

As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
example.

Post by Mikko
If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
whether it is correct to call it "belief".

*An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
are not of types fitting together.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944

The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
another problem.

The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth
preserving operations) to Facts.

But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic
propositions. The way you keep falling back to it shows that your
understanding of Logic is very limited.

The architecture Prolog implementations can be extended to
an arbitrary number of simultaneous orders of logic, like
type theory or a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
The only thing that were are taking from Prolog is the notion of
Facts and Rules and true means expression X is only true on L when
X is derived from Facts in L by applying Rules.
Facts apply to formal language and natural language and are
"an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true."
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Rules apply to natural language and are a sequence of truth
preserving operations.

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott
That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth
preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.

Right, but the connection might be infinite in length.

That would not be true in L.

Of course it would be, that is the DEFINITION.

This seems to be a core blind spot to yourself, which just shows your
ignorance.

Infinite chains establishing true is a needed part to allow unrestricted
universal qualification.

The truth of the statement "For all n in the Natural Numbers, f(n) > 0",
might only be able to be shown to be true by examining f(n) at every
Natural Number, all infinite number of them, but such a statement, by
the rules of Mathematics, must either be True or False.

Post by olcott
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false. // indicates infinite evaluation sequence

Which is just a non-sequitur, which seems to be the natural form of your
logic.

Post by olcott

Post by Richard Damon

Post by olcott
{Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.

Which you can't seem to explain how it differs from the classical
semantic truth created by the (possibly infinite) chain of logical
steps from the fundamental truth-makers of the system.

The key difference is that all expressions that were
previously undecidable become rejected as not truth-bearers
in L. The key benefit of this is that Tarski Undefinability
is refuted enabling LLM systems to be able to detect their
own falsehoods thus getting rid of AI hallucination.

You don't seem to understand what you are saying, to paraphrase a famous
quote, your lips are flapping, but nothing intelligent is coming out.

Trying to restrict "truth" to just what is knowable doesn't make your
system more powerful, but extremely less.

Post by olcott
We certainly can never have reliable artificial general
intelligence (AGI) when an AI system has no way to tell a
lie from the truth.

So? If *WE* can't alway tell if a statement is true or not, because we
are missing data about it, why do you think an AI could determine it?