Discussion:
A different perspective on undecidability
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olcott
2024-10-16 14:27:09 UTC
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The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers. When neither
YES nor NO is the correct answer to a YES/NO question then the question
itself is incorrect.

We can correct this problem very easily by applying truth preserving
operations to expressions of language that have been stipulated to be
true.

When this forms the foundation for a Tarski like:
True(L, x) predicate then ~True(L, x) & ~True(L, ~x) means that x is not
a truth bearer. When we do this then LP := ~True(LP) is rejected not a
truth bearer.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Mikko
2024-10-16 16:37:07 UTC
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Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-16 17:31:47 UTC
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Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not.
When the question: Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO, then the question
is rejected as not a truth bearer.
Post by Mikko
Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
olcott
2024-10-16 17:55:55 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not.
When the question: Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO, then the question
is rejected as not a truth bearer.
I did not say that exactly correctly.

When the question:
Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO,

then the statements:
(a) Finite string X is a theory of L
and
(b) Finite string X is NOT a theory of L

are rejected as not a truth bearers.
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-17 00:47:28 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not.
When the question: Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO, then the question
is rejected as not a truth bearer.
I did not say that exactly correctly.
Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO,
(a) Finite string X is a theory of L
and
(b) Finite string X is NOT a theory of L
are rejected as not a truth bearers.
How can there not be a Yes or No answer?

Either X IS or it IS NOT a theory of L, as either a proof exists or it
doesn't.

If X is non-sense, then it isn't a theory of L, as you can't prove
non-sense to be true in a non-contradictory L.

So, how can THOSE questions not be a truth bearers?

You don't seem to understad what Truth actually is.

I guess your logic is that there is no such thing as a non-contradictory
field of study.

But that is just because you don't seem to understand how logic actually
works.
Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
Mikko
2024-10-21 09:22:23 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not.
When the question: Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO, then the question
is rejected as not a truth bearer.
I did not say that exactly correctly.
I noticed. You should have said "Is finite string X a theorem of T?".
The letter L usually denotes the language of the theory of T, i.e. the
set of all syntactically correct formulas. The letter T is used for a
theory including its language, logic, and postulates.
--
Mikko
Mikko
2024-10-21 09:16:59 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not.
When the question: Is finite string X a theory of L?
has no correct answer from YES and NO, then the question
is rejected as not a truth bearer.
Post by Mikko
Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-16 22:34:51 UTC
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Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.

(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.

When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.

A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-17 00:47:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that can
be proven true?

Either X IS or it IS NOT a theory of L, as either a proof of its truth
exists or it doesn't.

If X is non-sense, then it isn't a theory of L, as you can't prove
non-sense to be true in a non-contradictory L.

So, how can THOSE questions not be a truth bearers?

You don't seem to understad what Truth actually is.

I guess your logic is that there is no such thing as a non-contradictory
field of study.

But that is just because you don't seem to understand how logic actually
works.
olcott
2024-10-17 00:51:14 UTC
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Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that can
be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in this post.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-17 11:16:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that
can be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in this post.
You said "The whole notion of undecidabioiut is anchord in ignoring the
fat that some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers"

As explain, "undeciability" of a system is based on the question of if
there are some expressions in it that can not be determined if they are
a provable theorem in the system (the only kind of theorems that exist)
or not.

The question "Is X a Theorem of L" can not be a statement without a
truth value, as X either CAN be proven or it can not (we might not KNOW
if it is provable, which is what leads to undecidability, but in fact,
it either is or it isn;t).

IF x is a statement without a truth value, the answer to the quesiton
about x will just be false, as no consistant system can prove a
non-truthbearer.

Thus, you DID says something like that, but are apparently too stupid to
undertstand that you did.

My only conclusion from your remarks is that you must be assuming that
all logic system are inconsistant, so the question of the provability of
some statements doesn't have a truth value because the statement might
be both provable and not provable at the same time.
olcott
2024-10-17 14:53:29 UTC
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Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that can
be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in the words shown
immediately above. Maybe the reason that you get
so confused is that you never respond to the exact
words that I just said right now.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-18 23:17:06 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that
can be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in the words shown
immediately above. Maybe the reason that you get
so confused is that you never respond to the exact
words that I just said right now.
Then what are you referring to if other than your initial claim?

What statement are you saying simply not being a truth bearer makes the
definition of undecidability incorrect?

I reply to your WHOLE message, as context matters.

Your statements (1) and (2) are just clearification that you understand
the problem, but then how can the fact that we can show that there can
be some statements we can not know if they are provable or not, not be a
valid proof of the system being undecidable?

Note, that the fact that we haven't been able to demonstrate that a
proof exists, is not in itself a proof that no such proof exists. If the
Turing Machine existed, then all True Statements would be provable, all
False statements refutable, and all non-truthbears detectable for being
that.

The fact that it can be shown that there can exist statements in a
language L, that are TRUE, but not provable in that language, show that
there exist language Ls that are undecidable.
olcott
2024-10-18 23:43:15 UTC
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Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that
can be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in the words shown
immediately above. Maybe the reason that you get
so confused is that you never respond to the exact
words that I just said right now.
Then what are you referring to if other than your initial claim?
What statement are you saying simply not being a truth bearer makes the
definition of undecidability incorrect?
I reply to your WHOLE message, as context matters.
Your statements (1) and (2) are just clearification that you understand
the problem, but then how can the fact that we can show that there can
be some statements we can not know if they are provable or not, not be a
valid proof of the system being undecidable?
Note, that the fact that we haven't been able to demonstrate that a
proof exists, is not in itself a proof that no such proof exists.
When one thinks of proofs as finite string transformation
rules then one finite string can be transformed into another
according to the transformation rules or not.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-19 02:49:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that
can be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in the words shown
immediately above. Maybe the reason that you get
so confused is that you never respond to the exact
words that I just said right now.
Then what are you referring to if other than your initial claim?
What statement are you saying simply not being a truth bearer makes
the definition of undecidability incorrect?
I reply to your WHOLE message, as context matters.
Your statements (1) and (2) are just clearification that you
understand the problem, but then how can the fact that we can show
that there can be some statements we can not know if they are provable
or not, not be a valid proof of the system being undecidable?
Note, that the fact that we haven't been able to demonstrate that a
proof exists, is not in itself a proof that no such proof exists.
When one thinks of proofs as finite string transformation
rules then one finite string can be transformed into another
according to the transformation rules or not.
Right, and it has been proven that for a sufficiently powerful system,
it is possible to create a statement, that is true in the system, but no
finite sequence of transformations makes a proof of the statement, but
it is only established by an infinite string of transformations, which
is enough to create a truth, but not a proof.

This has been explained to you many times, and the fact you still don't
get it just shows your stupidity and ignorance of the subject.
Mikko
2024-10-21 09:36:16 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
How can there not be a Yes or No answer to it being a statement that
can be proven true?
I didn't say anything like that in the words shown
immediately above. Maybe the reason that you get
so confused is that you never respond to the exact
words that I just said right now.
Then what are you referring to if other than your initial claim?
What statement are you saying simply not being a truth bearer makes the
definition of undecidability incorrect?
I reply to your WHOLE message, as context matters.
Your statements (1) and (2) are just clearification that you understand
the problem, but then how can the fact that we can show that there can
be some statements we can not know if they are provable or not, not be
a valid proof of the system being undecidable?
Note, that the fact that we haven't been able to demonstrate that a
proof exists, is not in itself a proof that no such proof exists.
When one thinks of proofs as finite string transformation
rules then one finite string can be transformed into another
according to the transformation rules or not.
Typical logic systems have transformation rules that transform two
strings to one. For example, you cannot infer A ∧ B from A nor from
B but if you have both A and B then you can infer A ∧ B.
--
Mikko
Mikko
2024-10-21 09:30:59 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
*I still said that wrong*
(1) There is a finite set of expressions of language
that are stipulated to be true (STBT) in theory L.
(2) There is a finite set of true preserving operations
(TPO) that can be applied to this finite set in theory L.
When formula x cannot be derived by applying the TPO
of L to STBT of L then x is not a theorem of L.
A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be
true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments.
https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
Better. The word "theory" starts with T so instead of L the
letter T should be used as the name of a theory.

In a formal theory no set of expressions are stipuated to be
true. Instead they are defined to be the postulates of the
theory.

When discussing a formal theory the theorems are not assumed to
be true. They can be true in one interpretation and false in
another one.

Whether the inference rules of a theory are truth preserving is
a matter of separate investigation.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-22 02:04:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...

If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.

An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.

When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-22 02:48:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual answer
to it,

Not that we don't know the answer to it.

For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is False,
it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there isn't a
highest pair of primes that differs by two.

The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.

Some truth is just unknowable.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but is
either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.

That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.

You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to make
youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a pathetic
ignorant pathological lying idiot.

Sorry, but that is the facts.
olcott
2024-10-22 03:17:37 UTC
Reply
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Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual answer
to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is False,
it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there isn't a
highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but is
either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
the following sentence is true or false:
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.

That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to make
youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a pathetic
ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-22 11:22:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there
isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but is
either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you can't
understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and that loses
some critical properties.
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is talking
about doesn't make him wrong.

You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof makes
you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to
make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a
pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
olcott
2024-10-22 14:56:27 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there
isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but is
either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you can't
understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and that loses
some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
stipulated to be true:

Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.

We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.

https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is talking
about doesn't make him wrong.
You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof makes
you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to
make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a
pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-23 03:02:23 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there
isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but
is either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you can't
understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and that
loses some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
   Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
   elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.
We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
So, DO THAT then, and show what you get.

So, just as Z and F did, and went through ALL the logical proofs to show
what you could do with there rules, write up your complete set of rules
and then show what can be done with it.

You have been told this for years, but don't seem to understand, perhaps
because you don't understand the basics well enough to actually do that.

Note, it isn't just the summary you will find on the informal sites that
you need to do, but the FORMAL PROOF that is in their academic papers.

Papers you probably can't understand.

And not, that since you are moving to a more basic level, of changing
the fundamental rules of the logic, you can't just assume any of the
existing logic principles still work.

This may well be the sort of thing where it takes 20 pages to show that
2 + 3 = 5 at the fundamental level of defining what + means.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is talking
about doesn't make him wrong.
You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof makes
you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to
make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a
pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
olcott
2024-10-23 13:20:25 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there
isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but
is either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you can't
understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and that
loses some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.
We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
So, DO THAT then, and show what you get.
So, just as Z and F did, and went through ALL the logical proofs to show
what you could do with there rules, write up your complete set of rules
and then show what can be done with it.
They could have accomplished the same thing by merely
adding the rule that no set can be a member of itself.
This by itself eliminates Russell's Paradox.
Post by Richard Damon
You have been told this for years, but don't seem to understand, perhaps
because you don't understand the basics well enough to actually do that.
Note, it isn't just the summary you will find on the informal sites that
you need to do, but the FORMAL PROOF that is in their academic papers.
Papers you probably can't understand.
And not, that since you are moving to a more basic level, of changing
the fundamental rules of the logic, you can't just assume any of the
existing logic principles still work.
What would stop working in Naive Set theory if we simply
added the axiom that no set can be a member of itself?
Post by Richard Damon
This may well be the sort of thing where it takes 20 pages to show that
2 + 3 = 5 at the fundamental level of defining what + means.
Not when the algorithm for doing first-grade arithmetic
on ASCII digit strings is provided.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is talking
about doesn't make him wrong.
You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof
makes you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE to
make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into a
pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-24 02:58:04 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or there
isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make the
question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know) but
is either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you
can't understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and
that loses some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.
We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
So, DO THAT then, and show what you get.
So, just as Z and F did, and went through ALL the logical proofs to
show what you could do with there rules, write up your complete set of
rules and then show what can be done with it.
They could have accomplished the same thing by merely
adding the rule that no set can be a member of itself.
This by itself eliminates Russell's Paradox.
Post by Richard Damon
You have been told this for years, but don't seem to understand,
perhaps because you don't understand the basics well enough to
actually do that.
Note, it isn't just the summary you will find on the informal sites
that you need to do, but the FORMAL PROOF that is in their academic
papers.
Papers you probably can't understand.
And not, that since you are moving to a more basic level, of changing
the fundamental rules of the logic, you can't just assume any of the
existing logic principles still work.
What would stop working in Naive Set theory if we simply
added the axiom that no set can be a member of itself?
That wouldn't affect it at all, since the use of axioms is always voluntary.

When you are doing logic, are you checking at each step against every
"rule" to see if you are violating any?

No, because that isn't how logic works.

This seens to be a common problem with you, showing your total lack of
understanding on how logic works.

The is not "interrupt" in logic that catches you if you try to put a bad
assumption into the system, it just blows the system up.

Now, if you want to try to see how a logic system would work with a rule
like that, go ahead and try.

My first thought would be that suddenly your system will have "memory"
and the truth of some statments might bepend on the order you have done
things before, determining which gate gets closed by your "interrupt" rule.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
This may well be the sort of thing where it takes 20 pages to show
that 2 + 3 = 5 at the fundamental level of defining what + means.
Not when the algorithm for doing first-grade arithmetic
on ASCII digit strings is provided.
But "First Grade arithmetic" isn't able to PROVE its answers.

But then, it seems your logic can\'t do that either and it seems you
don't understand that problem.

I still remember the difficulties I gave my elementary school teachers
when I would ask them "Why?" for some of the things they were teaching,
when the methods commonly used were just rote memorization.

Fortunately, there was some "New Math" available that had some of the
answers about Why?
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is
talking about doesn't make him wrong.
You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof
makes you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE
to make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself into
a pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
olcott
2024-10-24 13:14:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it is
False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or
there isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make
the question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know)
but is either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you
can't understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it, and
that loses some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.
We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
So, DO THAT then, and show what you get.
So, just as Z and F did, and went through ALL the logical proofs to
show what you could do with there rules, write up your complete set
of rules and then show what can be done with it.
They could have accomplished the same thing by merely
adding the rule that no set can be a member of itself.
This by itself eliminates Russell's Paradox.
Post by Richard Damon
You have been told this for years, but don't seem to understand,
perhaps because you don't understand the basics well enough to
actually do that.
Note, it isn't just the summary you will find on the informal sites
that you need to do, but the FORMAL PROOF that is in their academic
papers.
Papers you probably can't understand.
And not, that since you are moving to a more basic level, of changing
the fundamental rules of the logic, you can't just assume any of the
existing logic principles still work.
What would stop working in Naive Set theory if we simply
added the axiom that no set can be a member of itself?
That wouldn't affect it at all, since the use of axioms is always voluntary.
So when a first grade student answers the question
What is the sum of 2 + 3?
and they answer: "a box of stale donuts"
they are correct because the use of axioms is always
voluntary?

Why do you say such screwy things?
Post by Richard Damon
When you are doing logic, are you checking at each step against every
"rule" to see if you are violating any?
No, because that isn't how logic works.
This seens to be a common problem with you, showing your total lack of
understanding on how logic works.
The is not "interrupt" in logic that catches you if you try to put a bad
assumption into the system, it just blows the system up.
Now, if you want to try to see how a logic system would work with a rule
like that, go ahead and try.
My first thought would be that suddenly your system will have "memory"
and the truth of some statments might bepend on the order you have done
things before, determining which gate gets closed by your "interrupt" rule.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
This may well be the sort of thing where it takes 20 pages to show
that 2 + 3 = 5 at the fundamental level of defining what + means.
Not when the algorithm for doing first-grade arithmetic
on ASCII digit strings is provided.
But "First Grade arithmetic" isn't able to PROVE its answers.
But then, it seems your logic can\'t do that either and it seems you
don't understand that problem.
I still remember the difficulties I gave my elementary school teachers
when I would ask them "Why?" for some of the things they were teaching,
when the methods commonly used were just rote memorization.
Fortunately, there was some "New Math" available that had some of the
answers about Why?
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
That does not mean that True(L,x) cannot be defined.
It only means that some expression ore not truth bearers.
His proof does, the fact that you don't undetstand what he is
talking about doesn't make him wrong.
You asserting he is wrong becuase you don't understand his proof
makes you wrong, and STUPID.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That the H that it was built from won't give the right answer is irrelevent.
You just don't understand what the terms mean, because you CHOSE
to make youself ignorant, and thus INTENTIONALY made yourself
into a pathetic ignorant pathological lying idiot.
Sorry, but that is the facts.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-24 23:44:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
Only if "can not be determined" means that there isn't an actual
answer to it,
Not that we don't know the answer to it.
For instance, the Twin Primes conjecture is either True, or it
is False, it can't be a non-truth-bearer, as either there is or
there isn't a highest pair of primes that differs by two.
Sure.
So, you agree your definition is wrong
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
The fact we don't know, and maybe can never know, doesn't make
the question incorrect.
Some truth is just unknowable.
Sure.
And again.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
Right, and a question that we don't know (or maybe can't know)
but is either true or false, is not an incorrect question.
Sure.
So you argee again that you proposition is wrong.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Does D halt, is not an incorrect question, as it will halt or not.
Tarski is a simpler example for this case.
His theory rightfully cannot determine whether
"This sentence is not true".
Because that sentence is not a truth bearer.
No, that isn't his statement, but of course your problem is you
can't understand his actual statement so need to paraphrase it,
and that loses some critical properties.
Haskell Curry species expressions of theory {T} that are
    Thus, given {T}, an elementary theorem is an
    elementary statement which is true.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
When we start with the foundation that True(L,x) is defined
as applying a set of truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions of language stipulated to be true Tarski's
proof fails.
We overcome Tarski Undefinability the same way that ZFC
overcame Russell's Paradox. We replace the prior foundation
with a new one.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
So, DO THAT then, and show what you get.
So, just as Z and F did, and went through ALL the logical proofs to
show what you could do with there rules, write up your complete set
of rules and then show what can be done with it.
They could have accomplished the same thing by merely
adding the rule that no set can be a member of itself.
This by itself eliminates Russell's Paradox.
Post by Richard Damon
You have been told this for years, but don't seem to understand,
perhaps because you don't understand the basics well enough to
actually do that.
Note, it isn't just the summary you will find on the informal sites
that you need to do, but the FORMAL PROOF that is in their academic
papers.
Papers you probably can't understand.
And not, that since you are moving to a more basic level, of
changing the fundamental rules of the logic, you can't just assume
any of the existing logic principles still work.
What would stop working in Naive Set theory if we simply
added the axiom that no set can be a member of itself?
That wouldn't affect it at all, since the use of axioms is always voluntary.
So when a first grade student answers the question
What is the sum of 2 + 3?
and they answer: "a box of stale donuts"
they are correct because the use of axioms is always
voluntary?
No, because they can't show how to get there from the facts (axioms)
they have been given.

This seems to show the stupidity of your logic.

To show something, you need to build the finite string of operations
from the given facts (axioms) using the finite set of operations, to get
to you comclusion.

If there is a fact you didn't need, or an operation you didn't need to
use, that is fine.

Logic doesn't have rules like "X can not be equal to Y, and any
operation that might show that X is equal to Y can't be used".

We might have an initial assumption, or even a definition that X was not
Y. And if we do, then if we can show that X was equal to Y, then that
just means that either we did a step that was valid, or that the rules
for the system are just inconsistant.

This idea seems beyound your understanding.
Post by olcott
Why do you say such screwy things?
I don't, you do, because you don't know what you are saying.
Mikko
2024-10-22 07:39:52 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.

A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.

Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.

Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-22 15:04:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Mikko
2024-10-24 14:06:08 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-24 16:07:03 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability. It does eliminate undecidability
and not bothering to look at it is no actual rebuttal.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-24 23:46:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability. It does eliminate undecidability
and not bothering to look at it is no actual rebuttal.
So, you admit that you haven't actually rebutted any of the errors
pointed out in your logic, as saying they are not interesting isn't
actually a rebuttal.

Thus you admit that nothing you have said has any useful basis.
Mikko
2024-10-25 08:14:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty. Ae also know
that a good foundation to computability does not eliminate
undecidablility but proves it, and also proves uncomputablility
of various functions.

Whether some foundation can be correct or what it would mean to
call it so is a different problem.
Post by olcott
It does eliminate undecidability
and not bothering to look at it is no actual rebuttal.
You may say so but you don't offer any good argument to support
that claim. Instead you offer various indications that you will
never present a good argument about anything.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-25 14:37:19 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
Post by Mikko
Ae also know
that a good foundation to computability does not eliminate
undecidablility but proves it, and also proves uncomputablility
of various functions.
Whether some foundation can be correct or what it would mean to
call it so is a different problem.
Post by olcott
It does eliminate undecidability
and not bothering to look at it is no actual rebuttal.
You may say so but you don't offer any good argument to support
that claim. Instead you offer various indications that you will
never present a good argument about anything.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-25 16:01:02 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
Then you plan to do the work to show this?

Or do you think ZF only wrote down there rules and said to everyone,
just believe us, this fixes everything.

Of course, my guess is you have on idea how to do that, as you don't
understand how the logic works.

I am not sure if you understand what is needed to even properly define
your initial set of axioms to build your logic on.

And by changing the rules of logic, you need to rederive the rules of
logic under your system, and then show that they are at least as useful
as the classical one.

ZF had the advantage that it was well known that "Naive" set theory was
broken, and so people were looking for something to replace it.

Until you can actually demonstrate that something logictians want is
broken, you have a major uphill battle.

The fact that many systems are incomplete, and many problems turn out to
be uncomputable isn't a problem in logic, as it has been shown to be a
pretty natural proerty following from the power of the logic system to
express more than can be actually known.

All I can see is your logic system tries to work by limiting what can be
talked about, to keep things under that threshold where capability to
express grows faster than the capability to know does, which leads to
those properties.

I am also not sure if your ideas are really knew, as there are a number
of theories of restricted logic, and you haven't been about to define
yours well enough to compare them. I am not sure YOU even undertstand
what you want well enough to actually definie it to do so.
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Ae also know
that a good foundation to computability does not eliminate
undecidablility but proves it, and also proves uncomputablility
of various functions.
Whether some foundation can be correct or what it would mean to
call it so is a different problem.
Post by olcott
It does eliminate undecidability
and not bothering to look at it is no actual rebuttal.
You may say so but you don't offer any good argument to support
that claim. Instead you offer various indications that you will
never present a good argument about anything.
Mikko
2024-10-26 07:52:35 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way. ZFC is a useful set theory for many purposes.
You don't offer any useful theory for any purpose.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-26 12:59:33 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.

When we disallow the Liar Paradox then Tarski cannot derive
the first state of his proof and his proof fails.

Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf

Formalized as:
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf

adapted to become this
x ∉ Pr if and only if p // line 1 of the proof

Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p // assumption (see above)
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p // Tarski's convention T
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True; // axiom: ~True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x)
(6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True; // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
Post by Mikko
ZFC is a useful set theory for many purposes.
You don't offer any useful theory for any purpose.
If we had a True(L, x) that worked consistently and L
is formalized natural language then we could refute
all of the dangerous lies made for political gain in
real time before they gained any traction.

Because we don't have this it looks like there is a
good chance we will be seeing the rise of the Fourth
Reich in a few days.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-26 15:48:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference" was only directly
available in the definition of a set. By disallowing the set itself to
be in the set of things it can contain, ZF eleminated the problem.

For computations we have the problem that BY DEFINITION they need to be
able to handle "ANY" finite input string.

And, since any computation can be expressed as a finite string, we can
not exclude as the input, a string that represents the program (or
contains which incudes the program as part of the input).

The problem gets compounded in that there aren't just a "few" inputs
that could repreesent the program,
Post by olcott
When we disallow the Liar Paradox then Tarski cannot derive
the first state of his proof and his proof fails.
But he shows that you can, and thus your claim fails. All you are saying
is that if we take "all" to not mean "all" we might be able to do
something, but since all does mean all, that can't apply.
Post by olcott
Tarski's Liar Paradox from page 248
   It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy of the liar
   in the metalanguage, by forming in the language itself a sentence
   x such that the sentence of the metalanguage which is correlated
   with x asserts that x is not a true sentence.
   https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_247_248.pdf
By which he shows that the language itself has been shown to support the
representation of the Liar's Paradox, and thus it *IS* a valid input.
Post by olcott
x ∉ True if and only if p
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf
adapted to become this
x ∉ Pr if and only if p  // line 1 of the proof
Here is the Tarski Undefinability Theorem proof
(1) x ∉ Provable if and only if p       // assumption (see above)
(2) x ∈ True if and only if p              // Tarski's convention T
(3) x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True. // (1) and (2) combined
(4) either x ∉ True or x̄ ∉ True;      // axiom: ~True(x) ∨ ~True(~x)
(5) if x ∈ Provable, then x ∈ True;  // axiom: Provable(x) → True(x)
(6) if x̄ ∈ Provable, then x̄ ∈ True;  // axiom: Provable(~x) → True(~x)
(7) x ∈ True
(8) x ∉ Provable
(9) x̄ ∉ Provable
Post by Mikko
ZFC is a useful set theory for many purposes.
You don't offer any useful theory for any purpose.
If we had a True(L, x) that worked consistently and L
is formalized natural language then we could refute
all of the dangerous lies made for political gain in
real time before they gained any traction.
But Tarski shows that a True((L, x), defined to work on ALL x that are
expressable in L, can not be defined, as there exists some x that it can
not have a consistent value for.

Your logic requires that ALL doesn't actually mean ALL, and thus your
logic system is just not consistently defined.
Post by olcott
Because we don't have this it looks like there is a
good chance we will be seeing the rise of the Fourth
Reich in a few days.
You just don't understand cause and effect it seems.

It is YOUR type of thinking that is fueling those dangers, so consider
yourself part of the problem.
olcott
2024-10-26 21:57:33 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-27 01:04:53 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
Yes, IN SET THEORY, the "self-reference" can be banned, by the nature of
the contstruction.

In Computation Theory it can not, without making the system less than
Turing Complete, as the structure of the Computations fundamentally
allow for it, and in a way that is potentially undetectable.

You don't seem to understand that fact, but the fundamental nature of
being able to encode your processing in the same sort of strings you
process makes this a possibility.

Dues to the nature of its relationship to Mathematics and Logic, it
turns out that and logic with certain minimal requirements can get into
a similar situation.

Your only way to remove it from these fields is to remove that source of
"power" in the systems, and the cost of that is just too high for most
people, thus you plan just fails.

Of course, you understanding is too crude to see this issue, so it just
goes over your head, and your claims just reveal your ignorance of the
fields.

Sorry, that is just the facts, that you seem to be too stupid to understand.
olcott
2024-10-27 01:22:59 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
Yes, IN SET THEORY, the "self-reference" can be banned, by the nature of
the contstruction.
That seems to be the best way.
Post by Richard Damon
In Computation Theory it can not, without making the system less than
Turing Complete, as the structure of the Computations fundamentally
allow for it,
Sure.
Post by Richard Damon
and in a way that is potentially undetectable.
I really don't think so it only seems that way.
Post by Richard Damon
You don't seem to understand that fact, but the fundamental nature of
being able to encode your processing in the same sort of strings you
process makes this a possibility.
It does not make these things undetectable, it merely
allows failing to detect.
Post by Richard Damon
Dues to the nature of its relationship to Mathematics and Logic, it
turns out that and logic with certain minimal requirements can get into
a similar situation.
I think that I can see deeper than the Curry/Howard Isomorphism.
Computations and formal systems are in their most basic foundational
essence finite string transformation rules.
Post by Richard Damon
Your only way to remove it from these fields is to remove that source of
"power" in the systems, and the cost of that is just too high for most
people, thus you plan just fails.
Detection then rejection.
Post by Richard Damon
Of course, you understanding is too crude to see this issue, so it just
goes over your head, and your claims just reveal your ignorance of the
fields.
Sorry, that is just the facts, that you seem to be too stupid to understand.
In other words you can correctly explain every single detail
conclusively proving how finite string transformation rules
are totally unrelated to either computation and formal systems.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-27 11:38:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in
ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
Yes, IN SET THEORY, the "self-reference" can be banned, by the nature
of the contstruction.
That seems to be the best way.
It works for sets, but not for Computations, due to the way things are
defined.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
In Computation Theory it can not, without making the system less than
Turing Complete, as the structure of the Computations fundamentally
allow for it,
Sure.
So, you ADMIT that your computation system you are trying to advocate is
less than Turing Complete?

That means that the Halting Problem isn't a problem.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
and in a way that is potentially undetectable.
I really don't think so it only seems that way.
Of course it is.

The method of assigning meaning to the symbols can be done is a
meta-system that the system doesn't know about, and thus its meaning is
unknowable to the logic system.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
You don't seem to understand that fact, but the fundamental nature of
being able to encode your processing in the same sort of strings you
process makes this a possibility.
It does not make these things undetectable, it merely
allows failing to detect.
No, it makes things undetectable, unless you allow the system to just
reject ALL statements, even if they are not actually "self-referential"
to be considered "bad".
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Dues to the nature of its relationship to Mathematics and Logic, it
turns out that and logic with certain minimal requirements can get
into a similar situation.
I think that I can see deeper than the Curry/Howard Isomorphism.
Computations and formal systems are in their most basic foundational
essence finite string transformation rules.
You don't undertstand what you see.

Part of the problem is that while Compuation Theory and Formal Logic
System do have large parts that are just finite string transformation
rules, they have other parts that are not.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Your only way to remove it from these fields is to remove that source
of "power" in the systems, and the cost of that is just too high for
most people, thus you plan just fails.
Detection then rejection.
But since detection is impossible, you can not get to rejection.

Once you allow the creation of the statement, you can't reject it later
and still have the claim of handling "All".
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Of course, you understanding is too crude to see this issue, so it
just goes over your head, and your claims just reveal your ignorance
of the fields.
Sorry, that is just the facts, that you seem to be too stupid to understand.
In other words you can correctly explain every single detail
conclusively proving how finite string transformation rules
are totally unrelated to either computation and formal systems.
That isn't what I said, and just proves your stupidity.

You mind is just too small to handle these discussions.
olcott
2024-10-27 14:17:19 UTC
Reply
Permalink
I am keeping this post in both sci.logic and comp.theory
because it focuses on a similar idea to the Curry/Howard
correspondence between formal systems and computation.

Computation and all of the mathematical and logical operations
of mathematical logic can be construed as finite string
transformation rules applied to finite strings.

The semantics associated with finite string tokens can
be directly accessible to expression in the formal language.
It is basically an enriched type hierarchy called a knowledge
ontology.

A computation can be construed as the tape input to a
Turing machine and its tape output. All of the cases
where the output was construed as a set of final machine
states can be written to the tape.

I am not sure but I think that this may broaden the scope
of a computable function, or not.

The operations of formal systems can thus be directly
performed by a TM. to make things more interesting the
tape alphabet is UTM-32 of a TM equivalent RASP machine.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in
ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing
machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem
of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula
or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
Yes, IN SET THEORY, the "self-reference" can be banned, by the nature
of the contstruction.
That seems to be the best way.
It works for sets, but not for Computations, due to the way things are
defined.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
In Computation Theory it can not, without making the system less than
Turing Complete, as the structure of the Computations fundamentally
allow for it,
Sure.
So, you ADMIT that your computation system you are trying to advocate is
less than Turing Complete?
I never said that.
Post by Richard Damon
That means that the Halting Problem isn't a problem.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
and in a way that is potentially undetectable.
I really don't think so it only seems that way.
Of course it is.
The method of assigning meaning to the symbols can be done is a meta-
system that the system doesn't know about, and thus its meaning is
unknowable to the logic system.
When the only way that you learn is to memorize things from books
you make huge mistakes. It is the typical convention to assign
meaning in a way that the systems is unaware of. This is not the
only possible way. It is a ridiculously stupid way that causes
all kinds of undetectable semantic errors.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
You don't seem to understand that fact, but the fundamental nature of
being able to encode your processing in the same sort of strings you
process makes this a possibility.
Not at all. Tarski made this mistake of saying this and
everyone believed him.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
It does not make these things undetectable, it merely
allows failing to detect.
No, it makes things undetectable, unless you allow the system to just
reject ALL statements, even if they are not actually "self-referential"
to be considered "bad".
When we encode natural langugae as formal language
"This sentence is not true"
becomes:

?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).

?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

A detected error.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Dues to the nature of its relationship to Mathematics and Logic, it
turns out that and logic with certain minimal requirements can get
into a similar situation.
I think that I can see deeper than the Curry/Howard Isomorphism.
Computations and formal systems are in their most basic foundational
essence finite string transformation rules.
You don't undertstand what you see.
Part of the problem is that while Compuation Theory and Formal Logic
System do have large parts that are just finite string transformation
rules, they have other parts that are not.
You won't be able to show this. Try to define any computation
that cannot be expressed as a tape input and a tape output.

A TM takes its tape as input and has a set of final states and
or a tape output. The final states could be written to the tape.
You memorize from textbooks and I see deeper than textbooks say.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Your only way to remove it from these fields is to remove that source
of "power" in the systems, and the cost of that is just too high for
most people, thus you plan just fails.
Detection then rejection.
But since detection is impossible, you can not get to rejection.
Detection is "impossible" only because of foundational misconceptions.
Post by Richard Damon
Once you allow the creation of the statement, you can't reject it later
and still have the claim of handling "All".
Sure you can. As long as the error is detected before final
output all is well.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Of course, you understanding is too crude to see this issue, so it
just goes over your head, and your claims just reveal your ignorance
of the fields.
Sorry, that is just the facts, that you seem to be too stupid to understand.
In other words you can correctly explain every single detail
conclusively proving how finite string transformation rules
are totally unrelated to either computation and formal systems.
That isn't what I said, and just proves your stupidity.
You mind is just too small to handle these discussions.
You can't even form sound rebuttals. The main rebuttal that
you have is essentially anchored in ad hominem. Your rebuttals
never have anything in the ballpark of sound reasoning.

*The form of your best rebuttals*
I memorized X from a book and you are not doing it that way
therefore you are stupid and ignorant.

The philosophy of computation begins with existing ideas and
sees what happens when these ideas are reformulated.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-27 17:48:55 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
I am keeping this post in both sci.logic and comp.theory
because it focuses on a similar idea to the Curry/Howard
correspondence between formal systems and computation.
Computation and all of the mathematical and logical operations
of mathematical logic can be construed as finite string
transformation rules applied to finite strings.
The semantics associated with finite string tokens can
be directly accessible to expression in the formal language.
It is basically an enriched type hierarchy called a knowledge
ontology.
A computation can be construed as the tape input to a
Turing machine and its tape output. All of the cases
where the output was construed as a set of final machine
states can be written to the tape.
I am not sure but I think that this may broaden the scope
of a computable function, or not.
Except that nothing you described related to what a "computabe function"
is at all, as a "Computable Function" is just a Function (which is just
a specific, but arbitrary, mapping of an input space to an output space)
that can have a computation built that computes that mapping based on
representations of items in the input space to representations of items
in the output space.
Post by olcott
The operations of formal systems can thus be directly
performed by a TM. to make things more interesting the
tape alphabet is UTM-32 of a TM equivalent RASP machine.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in
ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing
machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem
of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula
or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example,
group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are
infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in
every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly
constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
Nope, because is set theory, the "self-reference"
does exist and is problematic in its several other instances.
Abolishing it in each case DOES ELIMINATE THE FREAKING PROBLEM.
Yes, IN SET THEORY, the "self-reference" can be banned, by the
nature of the contstruction.
That seems to be the best way.
It works for sets, but not for Computations, due to the way things are
defined.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
In Computation Theory it can not, without making the system less
than Turing Complete, as the structure of the Computations
fundamentally allow for it,
Sure.
So, you ADMIT that your computation system you are trying to advocate
is less than Turing Complete?
I never said that.
Sure you do.

You have said that D isn't allowed to make its own copy of H.

YOu have said that some inputs are just not allowed to be given.

In a Turing Complete system, ANY program can have a copy of it made and
be encorporated within the code of another totally independent program.

And a Turing Complete decider can take *ANY* input and decide on it.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
That means that the Halting Problem isn't a problem.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
and in a way that is potentially undetectable.
I really don't think so it only seems that way.
Of course it is.
The method of assigning meaning to the symbols can be done is a meta-
system that the system doesn't know about, and thus its meaning is
unknowable to the logic system.
When the only way that you learn is to memorize things from books
you make huge mistakes. It is the typical convention to assign
meaning in a way that the systems is unaware of. This is not the
only possible way. It is a ridiculously stupid way that causes
all kinds of undetectable semantic errors.
And when it is clear that you NEVER LEARNED anything you talk about, but
only rotely quote things out of ignroance, you prove yourself to be just
an ignorant pathological liar.

The "system" knows the mathematics of the numbers, and that might be all.

The "meta-system" can know properties of the numbers, and properties
that partucular operations preserve.

There is no "semantic" error, as the numbers have always meant what they
meant.

Note, the fact that it *IS* possible to assign this meaning in a way
that the system is unaware of, is what keeps the system from having any
ability to have a rule to reject things based on that meaning.

If there is a semantic error in the operation, then you should be able
to show where said error came about by a semantic error in the meta-system.

Remember, you can not get a semantic error by starting with just
semantically correct axioms, and applying only sematnically correct
operations to them.

If you can, then your system just started out broken.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
You don't seem to understand that fact, but the fundamental nature
of being able to encode your processing in the same sort of strings
you process makes this a possibility.
Not at all. Tarski made this mistake of saying this and
everyone believed him.
Nope, he PROVED that the statement was constructable with only the
assumption that True(L, x) existed as a predicate.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
It does not make these things undetectable, it merely
allows failing to detect.
No, it makes things undetectable, unless you allow the system to just
reject ALL statements, even if they are not actually "self-
referential" to be considered "bad".
When we encode natural langugae as formal language
"This sentence is not true"
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
A detected error.
And, you need to show how you got to that first encoding from a
semantically correct statement.

Yes, starting with an error, you can prove that there is an error.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Dues to the nature of its relationship to Mathematics and Logic, it
turns out that and logic with certain minimal requirements can get
into a similar situation.
I think that I can see deeper than the Curry/Howard Isomorphism.
Computations and formal systems are in their most basic foundational
essence finite string transformation rules.
You don't undertstand what you see.
Part of the problem is that while Compuation Theory and Formal Logic
System do have large parts that are just finite string transformation
rules, they have other parts that are not.
You won't be able to show this. Try to define any computation
that cannot be expressed as a tape input and a tape output.
Because I wasn't talking about a "Computation" but about the definition
of a FUNCTION, as defined in Computation Theory.

There is no requirement that Functions be expressable as a finite finite
string transformation.

It is just a mapping of a possible infinite set of input strings to
output strings by some rule, that is deterministic but may not
necessarily be finite.

For instance, Halt(M, d) maps to 1 if the Turing Machine M, when given
the input tape d, will halt is some finite number of steps (but no upper
bound to the number of steps it can take) while it maps to 0 if that
Machine given that data will keep on processing even when allowed to run
for an unbounded number of step (aka infinity). That definition is NOT a
"computation" as it does not always give an answer in a finite number of
steps, but is a mapping.
Post by olcott
A TM takes its tape as input and has a set of final states and
or a tape output. The final states could be written to the tape.
You memorize from textbooks and I see deeper than textbooks say.
But you seem to have missed what the theory was all about, and its focus
wasn't the behavior of the Turing Machine, that was just a tool to use
to define what IS computable, and to try to decide what is and what is
not computable.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Your only way to remove it from these fields is to remove that
source of "power" in the systems, and the cost of that is just too
high for most people, thus you plan just fails.
Detection then rejection.
But since detection is impossible, you can not get to rejection.
Detection is "impossible" only because of foundational misconceptions.
No, it is impossible because it is impossible in the actual field.

Since you got the field backwards, and think it is asking about behavior
of Turing Machines, you just don't undetstand what you are doing.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Once you allow the creation of the statement, you can't reject it
later and still have the claim of handling "All".
Sure you can. As long as the error is detected before final
output all is well.
And if that can't be done in a finite number of steps, it can't be done.

The problem is that *ALL* is a big number.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Of course, you understanding is too crude to see this issue, so it
just goes over your head, and your claims just reveal your ignorance
of the fields.
Sorry, that is just the facts, that you seem to be too stupid to understand.
In other words you can correctly explain every single detail
conclusively proving how finite string transformation rules
are totally unrelated to either computation and formal systems.
That isn't what I said, and just proves your stupidity.
You mind is just too small to handle these discussions.
You can't even form sound rebuttals. The main rebuttal that
you have is essentially anchored in ad hominem. Your rebuttals
never have anything in the ballpark of sound reasoning.
And you don't understand even what an ad hominem is. Ad hominem means I
say you are wrong because of something that you are, but that isn't what
I do. I point out your errors, by quoting the established FACTS of the
system. THAT is what makes you wrong, that you don't follow the REQUIRED
rules of the system you claim to be working in.

You ignore them, proving you are too stupid to know what you are doing,
thus PROVING my observations about you.

You aren't wrong because you are stupid, you are stupid because you keep
on insisting on things that have been proven wrong. That just follows
the meaning of the words.
Post by olcott
*The form of your best rebuttals*
I memorized X from a book and you are not doing it that way
therefore you are stupid and ignorant.
Nope, I can quote the RULE that defines the system, and which violating
puts you out of the system. You just admit you are out of the system
because you won't follow the rules, and then LIE that you are in the
system by trying to say the rules don't matter (when they are the
definition of what does matter).
Post by olcott
The philosophy of computation begins with existing ideas and
sees what happens when these ideas are reformulated.
Maybe the "Philospophy" of Computation, but not the SCIENCE of
Computation Theory.

SCIENCE follows the rules, something you don't seem to understand,
because you are just ignorant of the basics.

Sorry, you are just proving your utter ignorance of what you talk about
and your stupidity in reasoning about things that you claim you know.
olcott
2024-11-06 17:10:10 UTC
Reply
Permalink
[...] The statement itself does not change
when someone states it so there is no clear advantage in
saying that the statement was not a lie until someone stated
it.
    Disagree.  There is a clear advantage in distinguishing those
who make [honest] mistakes from those who wilfully mislead.
That is not a disagreement.
    I disagree. [:-)]
Then show how two statements about distinct topics can disagree.
You've had the free, introductory five-minute argument; the
half-hour argument has to be paid for. [:-)]
[Perhaps more helpfully, "distinct" is your invention. One same
statement can be either true or false, a mistake or a lie, depending on
the context (time. place and motivation) within which it is uttered.
Plenty of examples both in everyday life and in science, inc maths. Eg,
"It's raining!", "The angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.", "The
Sun goes round the Earth.". Each of those is true in some contexts, false
and a mistake in others, false and a lie in yet others. English has clear
distinctions between these, which it is useful to maintain; it is not
useful to describe them as "lies" in the absence of any context, eg when
the statement has not yet been uttered.]
There is another sense in which something could be a lie. If, for
example, I empatically asserted some view about the minutiae of medical
surgery, in opposition to the standard view accepted by practicing
surgeons, no matter how sincere I might be in that belief, I would be
lying. Lying by ignorance.
That is a lie unless you qualify your statement with X is a
lie(unintentional false statement). It is more truthful to
say that statement X is rejected as untrue by a consensus of
medical opinion.

This allows for the possibility that the consensus is not
infallible. No one here allows for the possibility that the
current received view is not infallible. Textbooks on the
theory of computation are NOT the INFALLIBLE word of God.
Peter Olcott is likewise ignorant about mathematical logic. So in that
sense, the false things he continually asserts _are_ lies.
*It is not at all that I am ignorant of mathematical logic*
It is that I am not a mindless robot that is programmed by
textbook opinions.

Just like ZFC corrected the error of naive set theory
alternative views on mathematical logic do resolve their
Russell's Paradox like issues.

(Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))

When True(L,x) is only a sequence of truth preserving operations
applied to x in L and False(L, x) is only a sequence of truth
preserving operations applied to ~x in L then Incomplete(L)
becomes Not_Truth_Bearer(L,x).

This is not any lack of understanding of mathematical logic.
It is my refusing to be a mindless robot and accept mathematical
logic as it is currently defined as inherently infallible.
--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Peerson
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
olcott
2024-11-06 23:39:24 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
[...] The statement itself does not change
when someone states it so there is no clear advantage in
saying that the statement was not a lie until someone stated
it.
    Disagree.  There is a clear advantage in distinguishing those
who make [honest] mistakes from those who wilfully mislead.
That is not a disagreement.
    I disagree. [:-)]
Then show how two statements about distinct topics can disagree.
You've had the free, introductory five-minute argument; the
half-hour argument has to be paid for. [:-)]
[Perhaps more helpfully, "distinct" is your invention. One same
statement can be either true or false, a mistake or a lie, depending on
the context (time. place and motivation) within which it is uttered.
Plenty of examples both in everyday life and in science, inc maths. Eg,
"It's raining!", "The angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.", "The
Sun goes round the Earth.". Each of those is true in some contexts, false
and a mistake in others, false and a lie in yet others. English has clear
distinctions between these, which it is useful to maintain; it is not
useful to describe them as "lies" in the absence of any context, eg when
the statement has not yet been uttered.]
There is another sense in which something could be a lie. If, for
example, I emphatically asserted some view about the minutiae of medical
surgery, in opposition to the standard view accepted by practicing
surgeons, no matter how sincere I might be in that belief, I would be
lying. Lying by ignorance.
That is a lie unless you qualify your statement with X is a
lie(unintentional false statement). It is more truthful to
say that statement X is rejected as untrue by a consensus of
medical opinion.
No, as so often, you've missed the nuances. The essence of the scenario
is making emphatic statements in a topic which requires expertise, but
that expertise is missing. Such as me laying down the law about surgery
or you doing the same in mathematical logic.
It is not at all my lack of expertise on mathematical logic
it is your ignorance of philosophy of logic as shown by you
lack of understanding of the difference between "a priori"
and "a posteriori" knowledge. Surgical procedures and
mathematical logic are in fundamentally different classes
of knowledge.
Post by olcott
This allows for the possibility that the consensus is not
infallible. No one here allows for the possibility that the
current received view is not infallible. Textbooks on the
theory of computation are NOT the INFALLIBLE word of God.
Gods have got nothing to do with it. 2 + 2 = 4, the fact that the world
is a ball, not flat, Gödel's theorem, and the halting problem, have all
been demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Regarding the last two they would have said the same thing about
Russell's Paradox and what is now known as naive set theory at the
time.

That you can't begin to imagine that mathematical logic might
not be infallible is definitely an error on your part as proven
by your failure to point put any error in the following:

(Incomplete(L) ≡ ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))

*When True(L,x) is only a sequence of truth preserving operations*
*applied to x in L and False(L, x) is only a sequence of truth*
*preserving operations applied to ~x in L then Incomplete(L) becomes*
*Not_Truth_Bearer(L,x) and nothing more*
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
olcott
2024-11-08 21:26:12 UTC
Reply
Permalink
[ .... ]
Much of what you say is wrong. That you strongly assert false things
outside your understanding is a form of lying. For what it's worth, I
find you highly disagreeable, and your contempt for truth and knowledge
truly despicable.
[ Material which is off-topic for this subthread deleted. ]
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*

https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
"an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true"

My key point is that when truth preserving operations are applied
to Haskell Curry elementary theorems of system F then they derive
every expression true in F.

That you want to disagree with this semantic tautology on the
basis of Ad Hominem attacks makes you look like a nitwit.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
wij
2024-11-08 21:33:34 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
[ .... ]
Much of what you say is wrong.  That you strongly assert false things
outside your understanding is a form of lying.  For what it's worth, I
find you highly disagreeable, and your contempt for truth and knowledge
truly despicable.
[ Material which is off-topic for this subthread deleted. ]
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
"an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true"
My key point is that when truth preserving operations are applied
to Haskell Curry elementary theorems of system F then they derive
every expression true in F.
That you want to disagree with this semantic tautology on the
basis of Ad Hominem attacks makes you look like a nitwit.
olcott is IDIOT (pathological) is not Ad Hominem. It is FACT.
Richard Damon
2024-11-08 22:03:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
*THIS philosophy of logic reformulates existing ideas on a new basis*
Except you haven't DEFINED your reformulation to any detail, so it
doesn't actually exist.

Try to do that first, before you make claims about it.
Richard Damon
2024-11-07 00:45:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
[...] The statement itself does not change
when someone states it so there is no clear advantage in
saying that the statement was not a lie until someone stated
it.
     Disagree.  There is a clear advantage in distinguishing those
who make [honest] mistakes from those who wilfully mislead.
That is not a disagreement.
     I disagree. [:-)]
Then show how two statements about distinct topics can disagree.
        You've had the free, introductory five-minute argument;  the
half-hour argument has to be paid for. [:-)]
        [Perhaps more helpfully, "distinct" is your invention.  One same
statement can be either true or false, a mistake or a lie, depending on
the context (time. place and motivation) within which it is uttered.
Plenty of examples both in everyday life and in science, inc maths.  Eg,
"It's raining!", "The angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.", "The
Sun goes round the Earth.".  Each of those is true in some contexts,
false
and a mistake in others, false and a lie in yet others.  English has
clear
distinctions between these, which it is useful to maintain;  it is not
useful to describe them as "lies" in the absence of any context, eg when
the statement has not yet been uttered.]
There is another sense in which something could be a lie.  If, for
example, I empatically asserted some view about the minutiae of medical
surgery, in opposition to the standard view accepted by practicing
surgeons, no matter how sincere I might be in that belief, I would be
lying.  Lying by ignorance.
That is a lie unless you qualify your statement with X is a
lie(unintentional false statement). It is more truthful to
say that statement X is rejected as untrue by a consensus of
medical opinion.
But, in Formal System, like what you talk about, there ARE DEFINITION
that are true by definition, and can not be ignored.

To make a statement that is contrary to those definitions, is to knowing
say a falsehood, which makes it a lie, at least after the error has been
pointed out, and that
Post by olcott
This allows for the possibility that the consensus is not
infallible. No one here allows for the possibility that the
current received view is not infallible. Textbooks on the
theory of computation are NOT the INFALLIBLE word of God.
But in Formal System, the definition ARE "infallibe".

Yes, you might disagree with the definition, and form a competing
system, but you need to go to the effort to actually create that
definition, and make sure you are clear that you are working in an
alternate system.
Post by olcott
Peter Olcott is likewise ignorant about mathematical logic.  So in that
sense, the false things he continually asserts _are_ lies.
*It is not at all that I am ignorant of mathematical logic*
It is that I am not a mindless robot that is programmed by
textbook opinions.
But, then make claims about things in a system, which REQUIRE the
following of the definitions of the system, that ignore the definitions
of the system.
Post by olcott
Just like ZFC corrected the error of naive set theory
alternative views on mathematical logic do resolve their
Russell's Paradox like issues.
But, ZFC was a brand new system created, not a "fixing" of naive set theory.

We talk about what is true in ZFC, not what is true in the "fixed" naive
set theory.

Yes, the "default" lable of what system we are talking about when we
just use the term "Set Theory" changed, but, that was done by the
general consensus of the users of Set Theory (and not everyone actually
uses ZFC, but know enough to make it clear form context what system they
are in.

Snce you have yet to publish a formal definition of some alternate
system, just some loose ideas about what might be different, you can't
even make references to it, let alone try to assume that it is now the
"default" computaiton system.
Post by olcott
(Incomplete(L) ≡  ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
When True(L,x) is only a sequence of truth preserving operations
applied to x in L and False(L, x) is only a sequence of truth
preserving operations applied to ~x in L then Incomplete(L)
becomes Not_Truth_Bearer(L,x).
But, since Tarski showed that there are input to True(L, x) that can not
have a truth value, that means that True can not be a "predicate", since
Predicates are always truth bearers. True is defined such that:

If x is true in L, True(L, x) will be True.
If x is false in L (and thus ~x is true) then True(L, x) will be false
and if Truth_Bearer(L, x) is false, then True(L, x) will be False.

Note, True(L, x) is not the same as Truth(L, x) which returns the truth
value of x, but is a full predicate that just rejects (returns false)
for any statement that is not actually true.

Tarski shows that that such a predicate can not exist in a Formal Logic
system that meets certain minimal requirements.
Post by olcott
This is not any lack of understanding of mathematical logic.
It is my refusing to be a mindless robot and accept mathematical
logic as it is currently defined as inherently infallible.
No, it *IS* your refusal to understand what formal logic actually is,
and thus your repeated LYING about what is true.
Post by olcott
--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
    Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
    Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Peerson
olcott
2024-11-08 14:05:39 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
[...] The statement itself does not change
when someone states it so there is no clear advantage in
saying that the statement was not a lie until someone stated
it.
     Disagree.  There is a clear advantage in distinguishing those
who make [honest] mistakes from those who wilfully mislead.
That is not a disagreement.
     I disagree. [:-)]
Then show how two statements about distinct topics can disagree.
        You've had the free, introductory five-minute argument;  the
half-hour argument has to be paid for. [:-)]
        [Perhaps more helpfully, "distinct" is your invention.  One same
statement can be either true or false, a mistake or a lie, depending on
the context (time. place and motivation) within which it is uttered.
Plenty of examples both in everyday life and in science, inc maths.
Eg,
"It's raining!", "The angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.", "The
Sun goes round the Earth.".  Each of those is true in some contexts,
false
and a mistake in others, false and a lie in yet others.  English has
clear
distinctions between these, which it is useful to maintain;  it is not
useful to describe them as "lies" in the absence of any context, eg when
the statement has not yet been uttered.]
There is another sense in which something could be a lie.  If, for
example, I empatically asserted some view about the minutiae of medical
surgery, in opposition to the standard view accepted by practicing
surgeons, no matter how sincere I might be in that belief, I would be
lying.  Lying by ignorance.
That is a lie unless you qualify your statement with X is a
lie(unintentional false statement). It is more truthful to
say that statement X is rejected as untrue by a consensus of
medical opinion.
But, in Formal System, like what you talk about, there ARE DEFINITION
that are true by definition, and can not be ignored.
My basis expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
can only correct when they are coherent.

Truth preserving operations applies to these coherent set of
axioms also derived expressions defined to be true.

No other expressions of language of formal system L
are true in L.
Post by Richard Damon
To make a statement that is contrary to those definitions, is to knowing
say a falsehood, which makes it a lie, at least after the error has been
pointed out, and that
Contradictory axioms cannot be false because both sides of
the contradiction carry equal weight. Instead of false axioms
the formal system is incoherent thus incorrect.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
This allows for the possibility that the consensus is not
infallible. No one here allows for the possibility that the
current received view is not infallible. Textbooks on the
theory of computation are NOT the INFALLIBLE word of God.
But in Formal System, the definition ARE "infallibe".
Not when they contradict other definitions. We could say that
Russell's Paradox is undecidable yet only within incoherent
naive set theory. When we get rid of the incoherence RP ceases
to exist.
Post by Richard Damon
Yes, you might disagree with the definition, and form a competing
system, but you need to go to the effort to actually create that
definition, and make sure you are clear that you are working in an
alternate system.
That my simple system of expressions stipulated to be true
combined with the application of truth preserving operations
seems simple does not mean it is simplistic.

Before we proceed to define the set of truth preserving
operations we must first see that the value of such a
system does eliminate undecidability and incompleteness.
Unless we do this first we boggle the mind with too many
details to see this.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Peter Olcott is likewise ignorant about mathematical logic.  So in that
sense, the false things he continually asserts _are_ lies.
*It is not at all that I am ignorant of mathematical logic*
It is that I am not a mindless robot that is programmed by
textbook opinions.
But, then make claims about things in a system, which REQUIRE the
following of the definitions of the system, that ignore the definitions
of the system.
Post by olcott
Just like ZFC corrected the error of naive set theory
alternative views on mathematical logic do resolve their
Russell's Paradox like issues.
But, ZFC was a brand new system created, not a "fixing" of naive set theory.
A system that applies only truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions that have been stipulated to be true <is> by itself
a sufficiently complete system to be evaluated against my claims
about it.

Once it is understood that such a system does get rid of incompleteness
and undecidability thenn (then and only then) can we add details without
overwhelming the mind with too much detail
Post by Richard Damon
We talk about what is true in ZFC, not what is true in the "fixed" naive
set theory.
Yes, the "default" lable of what system we are talking about when we
just use the term "Set Theory" changed, but, that was done by the
general consensus of the users of Set Theory (and not everyone actually
uses ZFC, but know enough to make it clear form context what system they
are in.
Snce you have yet to publish a formal definition of some alternate
system, just some loose ideas about what might be different, you can't
even make references to it, let alone try to assume that it is now the
"default" computaiton system.
Post by olcott
(Incomplete(L) ≡  ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
When True(L,x) is only a sequence of truth preserving operations
applied to x in L and False(L, x) is only a sequence of truth
preserving operations applied to ~x in L then Incomplete(L)
becomes Not_Truth_Bearer(L,x).
But, since Tarski showed that there are input to True(L, x) that can not
have a truth value, that means that
Expressions that are not truth bearers wold be rejected as erroneous.
We really should not have to go over these same details 500 times.

That you keep "disbelieving" semantic tautologies is disingenuous at
best. Because people have continued to play trollish head games with
my work we may see the rise of the fourth Reich. This might have been
avoided if my system of dividing truth from lies was adopted earlier.
Post by Richard Damon
True can not be a "predicate", since
If x is true in L, True(L, x) will be True.
If x is false in L (and thus ~x is true) then True(L, x) will be false
and if Truth_Bearer(L, x) is false, then True(L, x) will be False.
x = "what time is it?"
True(English,x) == false
True(English,~x) == false
∴ x is not a truth-bearer in English
Post by Richard Damon
Note, True(L, x) is not the same as Truth(L, x) which returns the truth
value of x, but is a full predicate that just rejects (returns false)
for any statement that is not actually true.
Tarski shows that that such a predicate can not exist in a Formal Logic
system that meets certain minimal requirements.
Post by olcott
This is not any lack of understanding of mathematical logic.
It is my refusing to be a mindless robot and accept mathematical
logic as it is currently defined as inherently infallible.
No, it *IS* your refusal to understand what formal logic actually is,
and thus your repeated LYING about what is true.
That I am correcting Tarski's and you construe Tarski
as infallibe is your mistake not mine.
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
    Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
    Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Peerson
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-08 17:01:12 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
[...] The statement itself does not change
when someone states it so there is no clear advantage in
saying that the statement was not a lie until someone stated
it.
     Disagree.  There is a clear advantage in distinguishing those
who make [honest] mistakes from those who wilfully mislead.
That is not a disagreement.
     I disagree. [:-)]
Then show how two statements about distinct topics can disagree.
        You've had the free, introductory five-minute argument;  the
half-hour argument has to be paid for. [:-)]
        [Perhaps more helpfully, "distinct" is your invention.  One same
statement can be either true or false, a mistake or a lie,
depending on
the context (time. place and motivation) within which it is uttered.
Plenty of examples both in everyday life and in science, inc maths.
Eg,
"It's raining!", "The angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.", "The
Sun goes round the Earth.".  Each of those is true in some
contexts, false
and a mistake in others, false and a lie in yet others.  English
has clear
distinctions between these, which it is useful to maintain;  it is not
useful to describe them as "lies" in the absence of any context, eg when
the statement has not yet been uttered.]
There is another sense in which something could be a lie.  If, for
example, I empatically asserted some view about the minutiae of medical
surgery, in opposition to the standard view accepted by practicing
surgeons, no matter how sincere I might be in that belief, I would be
lying.  Lying by ignorance.
That is a lie unless you qualify your statement with X is a
lie(unintentional false statement). It is more truthful to
say that statement X is rejected as untrue by a consensus of
medical opinion.
But, in Formal System, like what you talk about, there ARE DEFINITION
that are true by definition, and can not be ignored.
My basis expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
can only correct when they are coherent.
Which just shows your ignorance.

If the statements of language are stipulated to be true in some formal
logic system, then they ARE true in that formal logic system.

If the statements are incoherent, then the system becomes incoherent,
but that doesn't affect the statements themselves in the sytsem.
Post by olcott
Truth preserving operations applies to these coherent set of
axioms also derived expressions defined to be true.
Right, and that includes expressions that are defined to be true after
an INFINITE sequence of steps
Post by olcott
No other expressions of language of formal system L
are true in L.
So?
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
To make a statement that is contrary to those definitions, is to
knowing say a falsehood, which makes it a lie, at least after the
error has been pointed out, and that
Contradictory axioms cannot be false because both sides of
the contradiction carry equal weight. Instead of false axioms
the formal system is incoherent thus incorrect.
Right, so if you want to claim a system is incorrect because of
incoherence, you need to be able to demonstrate that contradiction.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
This allows for the possibility that the consensus is not
infallible. No one here allows for the possibility that the
current received view is not infallible. Textbooks on the
theory of computation are NOT the INFALLIBLE word of God.
But in Formal System, the definition ARE "infallibe".
Not when they contradict other definitions. We could say that
Russell's Paradox is undecidable yet only within incoherent
naive set theory. When we get rid of the incoherence RP ceases
to exist.
No, they are still infallible. Contradictory definitions just make the
system contradictory (and thus mostly worthless).

You can't "get rid of" Russell's Paradox in a system that allows it to
be formed. You don't ban Russell's Paradox just by saying it isn't
allowed, you need to build a set of rules that make it impossible to
constuct the Paradox.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Yes, you might disagree with the definition, and form a competing
system, but you need to go to the effort to actually create that
definition, and make sure you are clear that you are working in an
alternate system.
That my simple system of expressions stipulated to be true
combined with the application of truth preserving operations
seems simple does not mean it is simplistic.
Which you can't show is part of the existing system, nor have you fully
defined an alternate system, so you can't use what you want to, because
there is no system they are defined in.
Post by olcott
Before we proceed to define the set of truth preserving
operations we must first see that the value of such a
system does eliminate undecidability and incompleteness.
Unless we do this first we boggle the mind with too many
details to see this.
No, you have the cart before the horse. You can't see if a system has
eliminated undecidability or incompleteness until you know what the
system might be.

You might investigate the sources of it in the standard system to think
what you might change, but you can't actually see the results of the
change until you build the system.

This is how most system are developed, with a cycling like that of trial
and error. Most of which, rarely gets published, only when they find
something that seems to actually be promising. Like the stages to ZFC,
where ZF preceded it.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Peter Olcott is likewise ignorant about mathematical logic.  So in that
sense, the false things he continually asserts _are_ lies.
*It is not at all that I am ignorant of mathematical logic*
It is that I am not a mindless robot that is programmed by
textbook opinions.
But, then make claims about things in a system, which REQUIRE the
following of the definitions of the system, that ignore the
definitions of the system.
Post by olcott
Just like ZFC corrected the error of naive set theory
alternative views on mathematical logic do resolve their
Russell's Paradox like issues.
But, ZFC was a brand new system created, not a "fixing" of naive set theory.
A system that applies only truth preserving operations to a set
of expressions that have been stipulated to be true <is> by itself
a sufficiently complete system to be evaluated against my claims
about it.
Like every classical Formal Logic.
Post by olcott
Once it is understood that such a system does get rid of incompleteness
and undecidability thenn (then and only then) can we add details without
overwhelming the mind with too much detail
But it doesn't, not if the system allows sufficiently expressive
operations, like mathematics.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
We talk about what is true in ZFC, not what is true in the "fixed"
naive set theory.
Yes, the "default" lable of what system we are talking about when we
just use the term "Set Theory" changed, but, that was done by the
general consensus of the users of Set Theory (and not everyone
actually uses ZFC, but know enough to make it clear form context what
system they are in.
Snce you have yet to publish a formal definition of some alternate
system, just some loose ideas about what might be different, you can't
even make references to it, let alone try to assume that it is now the
"default" computaiton system.
Post by olcott
(Incomplete(L) ≡  ∃x ∈ Language(L) ((L ⊬ x) ∧ (L ⊬ ¬x)))
When True(L,x) is only a sequence of truth preserving operations
applied to x in L and False(L, x) is only a sequence of truth
preserving operations applied to ~x in L then Incomplete(L)
becomes Not_Truth_Bearer(L,x).
But, since Tarski showed that there are input to True(L, x) that can
not have a truth value, that means that
Expressions that are not truth bearers wold be rejected as erroneous.
We really should not have to go over these same details 500 times.
The probem is that you don't seem to understand the terms you are using.

The predicate "True" that Tarski talks about, can't "reject" a
statement, except by saying it isn't true (since non-truth-bearers
aren't true).

If the system can build as a grammatical statement in system L that

x is defined to be the expression ~True(L, x), then we find that the
system can't define a proper value for True(L, x) and thus can't define
the needed predicate "True".
Post by olcott
That you keep "disbelieving" semantic tautologies is disingenuous at
best. Because people have continued to play trollish head games with
my work we may see the rise of the fourth Reich. This might have been
avoided if my system of dividing truth from lies was adopted earlier.
That you keep on putting forward false and illogical statements as
semantic tautologies, you just show your utter stupidity.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
True can not be a "predicate", since Predicates are always truth
If x is true in L, True(L, x) will be True.
If x is false in L (and thus ~x is true) then True(L, x) will be false
and if Truth_Bearer(L, x) is false, then True(L, x) will be False.
x = "what time is it?"
True(English,x) == false
True(English,~x) == false
∴ x is not a truth-bearer in English
So?

Tarski didn't use True(L, ~x) he used ~True(L, x), and there is a
difference.

If x is a non-truth-bearer, then so is ~x, and True can return false for
both.

But True(L, x) will always be a truth-bearer for all expressions x by
its definition as a predicate, and just false if x isn't a truth-bearer.

That means that ~True(L, x) will also be a truth-bearer for all
expressions x by its definition as a predicate, and the properties of
the negation operator.

That means that if x IS the expression ~True(L, x) then we have a
problem with the figuring out what value True(L, x) will have for that
expression.

The key to Tarski's proof, that you just skip over, likely because you
can't understand it, it the part where he shows that such an expression
*IS* part of the language L, and thus an input that True(L, x) needs to
handle.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Note, True(L, x) is not the same as Truth(L, x) which returns the
truth value of x, but is a full predicate that just rejects (returns
false) for any statement that is not actually true.
Tarski shows that that such a predicate can not exist in a Formal
Logic system that meets certain minimal requirements.
Post by olcott
This is not any lack of understanding of mathematical logic.
It is my refusing to be a mindless robot and accept mathematical
logic as it is currently defined as inherently infallible.
No, it *IS* your refusal to understand what formal logic actually is,
and thus your repeated LYING about what is true.
That I am correcting Tarski's and you construe Tarski
as infallibe is your mistake not mine.
No, you are just not understanding Tarski.

You claim things he has proven as just "assumptions", showing your
ignorance of what he talks about.

That you continue after having it pointed out, just show that you are
nothing but a pathological liar.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
    Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
    Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Peerson
olcott
2024-11-09 23:24:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
[ .... ]
"sound deductive inference" is incoherent garbage.
Is a very stupid thing to say.
You lied about it in your usual fashion, and I took your lies at face
value.
I freaking quoted it how is that a damn lie?
A conclusion IS ONLY true when applying truth
preserving operations to true premises.
I'm not sure what that adds to the argument.
It is already specified that a conclusion can only be
true when truth preserving operations are applied to
expressions of language known to be true.
That Gödel's proof didn't understand that this <is>
the actual foundation of mathematical logic is his
mistake.
You're lying by lack of expertise, again. Gödel understood mathematical
logic full well (indeed, played a significant part in its development),
He utterly failed to understand that his understanding
of provable in meta-math cannot mean true in PA unless
also provable in PA according to the deductive inference
foundation of all logic.
You're lying in your usual fashion, namely by lack of expertise. It is
entirely your lack of understanding. If Gödel's proof was not rigorously
correct, his result would have been long discarded. It is correct.
Even if every other detail is 100% correct without
"true and unprovable" (the heart of incompleteness)
it utterly fails to make its incompleteness conclusion.

Perhaps you simply don't understand it at that level
thus will never have any idea that I proved I am correct.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
olcott
2024-11-10 15:11:47 UTC
Reply
Permalink
[ .... ]
Post by olcott
Gödel understood mathematical logic full well (indeed, played a
significant part in its development),
He utterly failed to understand that his understanding
of provable in meta-math cannot mean true in PA unless
also provable in PA according to the deductive inference
foundation of all logic.
You're lying in your usual fashion, namely by lack of expertise. It is
entirely your lack of understanding. If Gödel's proof was not rigorously
correct, his result would have been long discarded. It is correct.
Even if every other detail is 100% correct without
"true and unprovable" (the heart of incompleteness)
it utterly fails to make its incompleteness conclusion.
You are, of course, wrong here. You are too ignorant to make such a
judgment. I believe you've never even read through and verified a proof
of Gödel's theorem.
If you had a basis in reasoning to show that I was wrong
on this specific point you could provide it. You have no
basis in reasoning on this specific point all you have is
presumption.
Post by olcott
Perhaps you simply don't understand it at that level
thus will never have any idea that I proved I am correct.
More lies. You don't even understand what the word "proved" means.
Here is what Mathworld construes as proof
A rigorous mathematical argument which unequivocally
demonstrates the truth of a given proposition. A
mathematical statement that has been proven is called
a theorem. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Proof.html

the principle of explosion is the law according to which any statement
can be proven from a contradiction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

Validity and Soundness
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only
if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said
to be invalid.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is
both valid, and all of its premises are actually true.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

Here is the PL Olcott correction / clarification of all of
them. A proof begins with a set of expressions of language
known to be true (true premises) and derives a conclusion
that is a necessary consequence by applying truth preserving
operations to the true premises.

Mathworld
is correct yet fails to provide enough details.

The principle of explosion
is incorrect because its conclusion is not a necessary
consequence of applying truth preserving operations.
It fails to require semantic relevance.

Validity and Soundness
is incorrect because its conclusion is not a necessary
consequence of applying truth preserving operations.
It fails to require semantic relevance.
Post by olcott
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-10 19:13:03 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
[ .... ]
Post by olcott
Gödel understood mathematical logic full well (indeed, played a
significant part in its development),
He utterly failed to understand that his understanding
of provable in meta-math cannot mean true in PA unless
also provable in PA according to the deductive inference
foundation of all logic.
You're lying in your usual fashion, namely by lack of expertise.  It is
entirely your lack of understanding.  If Gödel's proof was not
rigorously
correct, his result would have been long discarded.  It is correct.
Even if every other detail is 100% correct without
"true and unprovable" (the heart of incompleteness)
it utterly fails to make its incompleteness conclusion.
You are, of course, wrong here.  You are too ignorant to make such a
judgment.  I believe you've never even read through and verified a proof
of Gödel's theorem.
If you had a basis in reasoning to show that I was wrong
on this specific point you could provide it. You have no
basis in reasoning on this specific point all you have is
presumption.
If you gave some actual formal basis for your reasoning, then perhaps a
formal reply could be made.

Since your arguement starts with mis-interpreatations of what Godel's
proof does, you start off in error.
Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Perhaps you simply don't understand it at that level
thus will never have any idea that I proved I am correct.
More lies.  You don't even understand what the word "proved" means.
Here is what Mathworld construes as proof
A rigorous mathematical argument which unequivocally
demonstrates the truth of a given proposition. A
mathematical statement that has been proven is called
a theorem. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Proof.html
the principle of explosion is the law according to which any statement
can be proven from a contradiction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
Right, and I have shown your that proof, and you haven't shown what
statement in that proof is wrong, so you have accepted it.

Thus, YOU are the one disagreeing with yourself.
Post by olcott
Validity and Soundness
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only
if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said
to be invalid.
A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is
both valid, and all of its premises are actually true.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Here is the PL Olcott correction / clarification of all of
them. A proof begins with a set of expressions of language
known to be true (true premises) and derives a conclusion
that is a necessary consequence by applying truth preserving
operations to the true premises.
But you aren't allowed to CHANGE those meanings.

Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.

And, if you want to talk in your logic system, you can't say it refutes
arguments built in other logic system.

At best you can show those proofs can't be built in your system, but
first you will need to show that your idea of a logic system can be used
to build formal systems with the power described as the prerequisites of
those proofs, which for Godel says you need to first show that your
equivalent of PA that can be built in your system supports the needed
properties.

My guesss is that will take you 10-20 years, if you can even do it, my
guess is it is actually beyond your ability to understand the processes.
Post by olcott
Mathworld
is correct yet fails to provide enough details.
The principle of explosion
is incorrect because its conclusion is not a necessary
consequence of applying truth preserving operations.
It fails to require semantic relevance.
What step in the proof was wrong?

Your failure means you accept that your logic is just inconsistant.
Post by olcott
Validity and Soundness
is incorrect because its conclusion is not a necessary
consequence of applying truth preserving operations.
It fails to require semantic relevance.
I don't think you understand what "semantics" are in formal logic.

It semms you really do need to start by throwing out EVERYTHING from the
existing logic systems, and fully define what you mean, and see what you
can prove with that.

Something on the order of Euclid's geometry.
Post by olcott
Post by olcott
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
olcott
2024-11-10 20:07:44 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
[ .... ]
Post by olcott
Gödel understood mathematical logic full well (indeed, played a
significant part in its development),
He utterly failed to understand that his understanding
of provable in meta-math cannot mean true in PA unless
also provable in PA according to the deductive inference
foundation of all logic.
You're lying in your usual fashion, namely by lack of expertise.
It is
entirely your lack of understanding.  If Gödel's proof was not
rigorously
correct, his result would have been long discarded.  It is correct.
Even if every other detail is 100% correct without
"true and unprovable" (the heart of incompleteness)
it utterly fails to make its incompleteness conclusion.
You are, of course, wrong here.  You are too ignorant to make such a
judgment.  I believe you've never even read through and verified a proof
of Gödel's theorem.
If you had a basis in reasoning to show that I was wrong
on this specific point you could provide it. You have no
basis in reasoning on this specific point all you have is
presumption.
If you gave some actual formal basis for your reasoning, then perhaps a
formal reply could be made.
Since your arguement starts with mis-interpreatations of what Godel's
proof does, you start off in error.
Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Perhaps you simply don't understand it at that level
thus will never have any idea that I proved I am correct.
More lies.  You don't even understand what the word "proved" means.
Here is what Mathworld construes as proof
A rigorous mathematical argument which unequivocally
demonstrates the truth of a given proposition. A
mathematical statement that has been proven is called
a theorem. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Proof.html
the principle of explosion is the law according to which any statement
can be proven from a contradiction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
Right, and I have shown your that proof, and you haven't shown what
statement in that proof is wrong, so you have accepted it.
Thus, YOU are the one disagreeing with yourself.
Post by olcott
Validity and Soundness
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only
if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said
to be invalid.
A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is
both valid, and all of its premises are actually true.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Here is the PL Olcott correction / clarification of all of
them. A proof begins with a set of expressions of language
known to be true (true premises) and derives a conclusion
that is a necessary consequence by applying truth preserving
operations to the true premises.
But you aren't allowed to CHANGE those meanings.
Within the philosophy of logic assumptions
can be changed to see where t that lead.
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
We don't really have a symbols for truth preserving operations.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry
elementary theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L)
then and only then is C is True in L.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf

(Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems(L) □ C) ≡ True(L, C)

This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because
Incomplete(L) is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
Post by Richard Damon
And, if you want to talk in your logic system, you can't say it refutes
arguments built in other logic system.
ZFC proves that naive set theory was incoherent.
Russell's paradox still exists in incoherent naive set theory.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
joes
2024-11-10 20:39:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
--
Am Sat, 20 Jul 2024 12:35:31 +0000 schrieb WM in sci.math:
It is not guaranteed that n+1 exists for every n.
olcott
2024-11-10 22:01:25 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.

For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-11 15:06:40 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable. except
by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just broken.

To try to define True as Provable means that one of the categories must
be changed, and thus your logic must be less powerful.

If you reduce Truth to just what is Provable, you system has lost some
truths, and likely even some that were provable before as you need to
limit what can be said.

If you expand Provable to Truth, then you have lost the concept of
Knowledge, that was based on Provable.
olcott
2024-11-13 04:37:48 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable. except
by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.

https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning
expressed in language is shown to be true this exact
same way.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-13 11:52:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because
Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable.
except by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just
broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.
Right, but there can be expressions of language that are true in L by an
INFINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations that are not provable
which needs a FINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations.

INFINITE is not FINITE so there is a difference.
Post by olcott
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning
expressed in language is shown to be true this exact
same way.
But not provable.

Truth allows infinite sequences.

Provable does.

Trying to Define Olcott-Provable to allow infinite sequences, doesn't
make actual Provable allow it.

It is just a LIE to use mis-defined terms in your logic, and that shows
that you fundamentally don't understand what you are talking about.
olcott
2024-11-13 16:44:16 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because
Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable.
except by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just
broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.
Right, but there can be expressions of language that are true in L by an
INFINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations that are not provable
which needs a FINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations.
If it is impossible to show that x is true in L and impossible
to show that ~x is true in L then x in not a truth bearer in L
and L is by no means in any way incomplete.

x = "This sentence is not true"
True(English, x) == false. True(English, ~x) == false.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-14 01:09:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable.
except by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just
broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.
Right, but there can be expressions of language that are true in L by
an INFINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations that are not
provable which needs a FINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations.
If it is impossible to show that x is true in L and impossible
to show that ~x is true in L then x in not a truth bearer in L
and L is by no means in any way incomplete.
x = "This sentence is not true"
True(English, x) == false. True(English, ~x) == false.
But if x can only be shown to be true by an INFINTE chain of steps,
which thus do not form the FINITE chain needed for a proof, L meets the
requirements for incompleteness.

And you meed the requirements for a blantant liar, as you KNOW that
proofs in standard logic are finite, while truth is allowed to be infinite.

So, you are just hoisted on your own strawman and burning your soul in
effigy.
olcott
2024-11-13 22:58:12 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because
Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable.
except by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just
broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.
Right, but there can be expressions of language that are true in L by an
INFINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations that are not provable
which needs a FINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations.
That is not relevant to my point. The Goldbach conjecture
is provable or refutable by Proof(Olcott).

Expressions that are not provable or refutable by
Proof(Olcott) are rejected as erroneous rather than
ruling Formal System(Olcott) is incomplete.

It never has been the case the the inability to prove or
refute a self-contradictory expression of language ever
makes its formal system in any way incomplete.

The only reason that Gödel incompleteness ever worked
is that it relied on a screwed up definition of True(),
that diverges from the way that truth really works.

Every expression that derives all of its truth on the
basis of relations to other expressions is simply untrue
when it totally lacks these relations.

The only other kind of truth that exists is truth that
relies on direct observation of physical stimuli.
Post by Richard Damon
INFINITE is not FINITE so there is a difference.
Post by olcott
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning
expressed in language is shown to be true this exact
same way.
But not provable.
Truth allows infinite sequences.
Provable does.
Trying to Define Olcott-Provable to allow infinite sequences, doesn't
make actual Provable allow it.
It is just a LIE to use mis-defined terms in your logic, and that shows
that you fundamentally don't understand what you are talking about.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-11-14 01:09:27 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
Post by joes
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry elementary
theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L) then and only then is C
is True in L.
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because Incomplete(L)
is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
I still can’t see how this makes ~C provable.
If C is not provable it is merely rejected as incorrect
not used as any basis to determine that L is incomplete.
For many reasons: "A sequence of truth preserving operations"
is a much better term than the term "provable".
But since there exist statements that are True but not Provable.
except by your incorrect definition of Provable, your logic is just
broken.
There cannot possibly be any expressions of language that
are true in L that are not determined to be true on the
basis of applying a sequence of truth preserving operations
in L to Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems in L.
Right, but there can be expressions of language that are true in L by
an INFINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations that are not
provable which needs a FINITE sequence of truth-preserving operations.
That is not relevant to my point. The Goldbach conjecture
is provable or refutable by Proof(Olcott).
So, Proof(Olcott) is not what determines Incompleteness, as
Proof(Olcott) doesn't establish Knowledge, because Proof(Olcott) is just
a worthless synonym for Truth.
Post by olcott
Expressions that are not provable or refutable by
Proof(Olcott) are rejected as erroneous rather than
ruling Formal System(Olcott) is incomplete.
So, Proof(Olcott) isn't a viable term for knowledge, and thus is worthless.
Post by olcott
It never has been the case the the inability to prove or
refute a self-contradictory expression of language ever
makes its formal system in any way incomplete.
Since that is the DEFINITION of "Completeness" you are just proving your
stupidity.
Post by olcott
The only reason that Gödel incompleteness ever worked
is that it relied on a screwed up definition of True(),
that diverges from the way that truth really works.
Nope. It uses the totally normal definition of True, and Provable.

YOU are the one that has diverges from the way that truth really works,
as you have shown it to be a concept foreign to you.
Post by olcott
Every expression that derives all of its truth on the
basis of relations to other expressions is simply untrue
when it totally lacks these relations.
But G doesn't do that. G is established in PA based on an infinite chain
of truth perserving operation in PA from the elementary truths of PA.
Post by olcott
The only other kind of truth that exists is truth that
relies on direct observation of physical stimuli.
Which is irelevent, just showing your stupidity.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
INFINITE is not FINITE so there is a difference.
Post by olcott
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
Everything that is true on the basis of its meaning
expressed in language is shown to be true this exact
same way.
But not provable.
Truth allows infinite sequences.
Provable does.
Trying to Define Olcott-Provable to allow infinite sequences, doesn't
make actual Provable allow it.
It is just a LIE to use mis-defined terms in your logic, and that
shows that you fundamentally don't understand what you are talking about.
Richard Damon
2024-11-10 21:00:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Post by olcott
[ .... ]
Post by olcott
Gödel understood mathematical logic full well (indeed, played a
significant part in its development),
He utterly failed to understand that his understanding
of provable in meta-math cannot mean true in PA unless
also provable in PA according to the deductive inference
foundation of all logic.
You're lying in your usual fashion, namely by lack of expertise.
It is
entirely your lack of understanding.  If Gödel's proof was not
rigorously
correct, his result would have been long discarded.  It is correct.
Even if every other detail is 100% correct without
"true and unprovable" (the heart of incompleteness)
it utterly fails to make its incompleteness conclusion.
You are, of course, wrong here.  You are too ignorant to make such a
judgment.  I believe you've never even read through and verified a proof
of Gödel's theorem.
If you had a basis in reasoning to show that I was wrong
on this specific point you could provide it. You have no
basis in reasoning on this specific point all you have is
presumption.
If you gave some actual formal basis for your reasoning, then perhaps
a formal reply could be made.
Since your arguement starts with mis-interpreatations of what Godel's
proof does, you start off in error.
Post by olcott
Post by olcott
Perhaps you simply don't understand it at that level
thus will never have any idea that I proved I am correct.
More lies.  You don't even understand what the word "proved" means.
Here is what Mathworld construes as proof
A rigorous mathematical argument which unequivocally
demonstrates the truth of a given proposition. A
mathematical statement that has been proven is called
a theorem. https://mathworld.wolfram.com/Proof.html
the principle of explosion is the law according to which any
statement can be proven from a contradiction.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
Right, and I have shown your that proof, and you haven't shown what
statement in that proof is wrong, so you have accepted it.
Thus, YOU are the one disagreeing with yourself.
Post by olcott
Validity and Soundness
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only
if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said
to be invalid.
A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is
both valid, and all of its premises are actually true.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Here is the PL Olcott correction / clarification of all of
them. A proof begins with a set of expressions of language
known to be true (true premises) and derives a conclusion
that is a necessary consequence by applying truth preserving
operations to the true premises.
But you aren't allowed to CHANGE those meanings.
Within the philosophy of logic assumptions
can be changed to see where t that lead.
But the theories you are talking about aren't in the "Phiosophy of
Logic" but in Formal Logic systems, where you can't change them.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
Sorry, but until you actually and formally fully define your logic
system, you can't start using it.
We don't really have a symbols for truth preserving operations.
So, I guess you are just admitting that you can't define what you are
talking about.
Post by olcott
When C is a necessary consequence of the Haskell Curry
elementary theorems of L (Thus stipulated to be true in L)
then and only then is C is True in L.
https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
And "Necessary Consequence" in formal logic means that if follows from a
(potentailly infinite) series of the defined operation on the defined
stipulated truths.

Godel did exactly that, showing that his statement G, which is that
there does not exist a number g that satisfies a particular primative
recursive relationship, MUST be true, and can not be proven in that
system, as the only sequence in the system that establishes the
necessary consequence is one of infinite length, namely being the
testing of every possible natural number, and seeing that it does not
meet the requirements.
Post by olcott
(Haskell_Curry_Elementary_Theorems(L) □ C) ≡ True(L, C)
This simple change does get rid of incompleteness because
Incomplete(L) is superseded and replaced by Incorrect(L,x).
Nope, just proves that you are too stupid to understand what you are
talking about.
Post by olcott
Post by Richard Damon
And, if you want to talk in your logic system, you can't say it
refutes arguments built in other logic system.
ZFC proves that naive set theory was incoherent.
Russell's paradox still exists in incoherent naive set theory.
No, Russels's paradox proved that naive set theory was incoherent.

ZFC was an alternate system proposed to fix the issue, and is immune to
Russell's paradox, as it doesn't allow the logic of Russell's paradox to
be formed.

Note, in some senses ZFC is weaker than Naive Set Theory, as there are
concepts in Naive Set Theory that can't be mapped to ZFC, and thus there
are other Set Theories used in some applications.

As has been pointed out, you are free to try to define your alternate
system of logic, but if you want to do that, you need to actually do the
work to create it, and not just have a concept of a plan.

You can perhaps talk about your ideas, and what they might or might not
be able to do, but until you actually build the system, and show what it
can do, and PROVE that it can meet the needed requirements, you can't
say that you can "solve" the problems that you are trying to refute.

A lot of what you talk about is actually old and has been tried before
(but of course since you don't know history, you are doomed to repeat
it) and while sometimes the results are interesting, they inverably
result in systems much "weaker" than classical logic, and I don't think
anyone has gotten a system to the point of support a good equivalent of
the full set of properties of the Natural Numbers, as it seems there is
something in the power to define that, which leads to things like
incompleteness.
Mikko
2024-10-27 08:27:02 UTC
Reply
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Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
There is no self reference in a formal theory. Expressions of a formal
theory don't refer.
--
Mikko
olcott
2024-10-27 13:29:19 UTC
Reply
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Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
There is no self reference in a formal theory. Expressions of a formal
theory don't refer.
Godel says otherwise.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
Richard Damon
2024-10-27 17:49:02 UTC
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Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring
the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
There is no self reference in a formal theory. Expressions of a formal
theory don't refer.
Godel says otherwise.
In Godel, the reference is "self", but a big circle that gets back to
its start.

He shows that Mathematics is capable of expressing that level of
recursive referencing.
Mikko
2024-10-28 09:08:11 UTC
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Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
Post by Mikko
Post by olcott
The whole notion of undecidability is anchored in ignoring the fact that
some expressions of language are simply not truth bearers.
A formal theory is undecidable if there is no Turing machine that
determines whether a formula of that theory is a theorem of that
theory or not. Whether an expression is a truth bearer is not
relevant. Either there is a valid proof of that formula or there
is not. No third possibility.
After being continually interrupted by emergencies
interrupting other emergencies...
If the answer to the question: Is X a formula of theory Y
cannot be determined to be yes or no then the question
itself is somehow incorrect.
There are several possibilities.
A theory may be intentionally incomplete. For example, group theory
leaves several important question unanswered. There are infinitely
may different groups and group axioms must be true in every group.
Another possibility is that a theory is poorly constructed: the
author just failed to include an important postulate.
Then there is the possibility that the purpose of the theory is
incompatible with decidability, for example arithmetic.
Post by olcott
An incorrect question is an expression of language that
is not a truth bearer translated into question form.
When "X a formula of theory Y" is neither true nor false
then "X a formula of theory Y" is not a truth bearer.
Whether AB = BA is not answered by group theory but is alwasy
true or false about specific A and B and universally true in
some groups but not all.
See my most recent reply to Richard it sums up
my position most succinctly.
We already know that your position is uninteresting.
Don't want to bother to look at it (AKA uninteresting) is not at
all the same thing as the corrected foundation to computability
does not eliminate undecidability.
No, but we already know that you don't offer anything interesting
about foundations to computability or undecidabilty.
In the same way that ZFC eliminated RP True_Olcott(L,x)
eliminates undecidability. Not bothering to pay attention
is less than no rebuttal what-so-ever.
No, not in the same way.
Pathological self reference causes an issue in both cases.
This issue is resolved by disallowing it in both cases.
There is no self reference in a formal theory. Expressions of a formal
theory don't refer.
Godel says otherwise.
No, he doesn't. Terms of formal system can be interpreted as references
but an interpretation is not a part of the formal theory. The word
"formal" means that only a form is defined but not any meaning. For
example, the meanings of the terms are not needed in order to determine
whether a finite sequence of finite strings is a proof.

There is a common interpretation of the symbols of Peano arithmetic:
the constant 0 means the empty set and the successor of the set X is
the set X ∪ {X}, and the meanings of the other operators follow from
that and their defining axioms; usually but not always the range of
meanings is restricted to the smallest collection of sets that contains
the exmpty set and the successor of every member. With this interpretation,
every term refers to a set so no term refers to itself or any other term
or any formula.
--
Mikko
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